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PH100 Lecture Notes

Moral intuitions are therefore both innate and

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requires input and shaping from a particular culture. Moral intuitions are therefore both innate and enculturated ” (826) Integrating Rationalism and Intuitionism The SI model integrates reasoning, emotion, intuition, and social influence It does not preclude the possibility that reasoning will cause moral judgments (claims 3, 5, 6) Can we test the SI model? Haidt's three suggestions: 1. Interfere with reasoning Expectations: moral judgements should remain the same (they are caused by intuitions); the quality of post hoc reasoning however should be affected. 2. Ecological variation: “…as the conditions of the interview are gradually changed to increase ecological validity, the social intuitionist model predicts that the reasoning produced should become recognizably post hoc” (829) 3. Consilience: “the degree to which facts and theories link up across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation” (830) November 20, 2012: Moral Psychology of Atrocity Doris and Murphy's conclusion: Perpetrators of atrocity typically occupy excusing conditions and are therefore not morally responsible for their conduct . While nothing justifies atrocity, many perpetrators manifest cognitive impairments that profoundly degrade their capacity for moral judgment, and such impairments, we shall argue, preclude the attribution of moral responsibility” (26)
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Support for claim comes from philosophical and empirical considerations → moral psychology of atrocity philosophical considerations will lead to conclusion: “…morally appropriate behavior requires cognitive feats – perceptual, interpretive, and deliberative – and cognitively degrading circumstances prevent their achievement; so individuals acting in such circumstances should, very often occupy excusing conditions” (26) empirical considerations will lead to conclusion: warfare is cognitively degrading so much so that it prevents agents involved in warfare to achieve the relevant cognitive feats The Argument P1: When individuals are cognitively degraded, they are not morally responsible for their behavior. (philosophical) P2: Individuals in combat are typically cognitively degraded. (empirical) Conclusion: Individuals in combat are typically not morally responsible for their behavior. Some important clarifications Clarification #1: The scope of “combat” “Combat” should be understood broadly: it includes individuals in combat zones who are not involved in fighting. Qualification for P2 Clarification #2: The argument is about responsibility for conduct not responsibility for participation the two types of responsibility are not necessarily connected: one may be responsible for participating in an unjust conflict without being culpable of certain specific acts; “one may commit atrocities when one’s cause is just.” (27) Qualification for P1 Clarification #3: Individuals are in excusing conditions only when that which brought about (or caused) the cognitively degrading circumstances was not their fault.
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