Moral intuitions are therefore both innate and

requires input and shaping from a particular culture. Moral intuitions are therefore both innate and
enculturated ” (826)
Integrating Rationalism and Intuitionism
• The SI model integrates reasoning, emotion, intuition, and social influence
• It does not preclude the possibility that reasoning will cause moral judgments (claims 3, 5, 6)
Can we test the SI model?
Haidt's three suggestions:
1. Interfere with reasoning
• Expectations: moral judgements should remain the same (they are caused by intuitions); the quality
of post hoc reasoning however should be affected.
2. Ecological variation: “…as the conditions of the interview are gradually changed to increase ecological
validity, the social intuitionist model predicts that the reasoning produced should become recognizably
post hoc” (829)
3. Consilience: “the degree to which facts and theories link up across disciplines to create a common
groundwork of explanation” (830)
November 20, 2012: Moral Psychology of Atrocity
Doris and Murphy's conclusion: “ Perpetrators of atrocity typically occupy excusing conditions and are
therefore not morally responsible for their conduct . While nothing justifies atrocity, many perpetrators manifest
cognitive impairments that profoundly degrade their capacity for moral judgment, and such impairments, we
shall argue, preclude the attribution of moral responsibility” (26)

• Support for claim comes from philosophical and empirical considerations → moral psychology of
atrocity
◦ philosophical considerations will lead to conclusion: “…morally appropriate behavior requires
cognitive feats – perceptual, interpretive, and deliberative – and cognitively degrading
circumstances prevent their achievement; so individuals acting in such circumstances should, very
often occupy excusing conditions” (26)
◦ empirical considerations will lead to conclusion: warfare is cognitively degrading so much so that it
prevents agents involved in warfare to achieve the relevant cognitive feats
The Argument
P1: When individuals are cognitively degraded, they are not morally responsible for their behavior.
(philosophical)
P2: Individuals in combat are typically cognitively degraded. (empirical)
Conclusion: Individuals in combat are typically not morally responsible for their behavior.
Some important clarifications
Clarification #1: The scope of “combat”
• “Combat” should be understood broadly: it includes individuals in combat zones who are not involved
in fighting.
• Qualification for P2
Clarification #2: The argument is about responsibility for conduct not responsibility for participation
• the two types of responsibility are not necessarily connected: one may be responsible for participating in
an unjust conflict without being culpable of certain specific acts; “one may commit atrocities when
one’s cause is just.” (27)
• Qualification for P1
Clarification #3: Individuals are in excusing conditions only when that which brought about (or caused) the
cognitively degrading circumstances was not their fault.