slides-chap6A-communication-soft

Forges f 1994 non zero sum repeated games and

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Forges, F. (1994) : “Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission,” dans Essays in Game Theory : In Honor of Michael Maschler , ed. par N. Megiddo, Springer-Verlag. Forges, F. et F. Koessler (2006) : “Long Persuasion Games,” THEMA Working Paper 2006–01. Grossman, S. J. (1981) : “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality,” Journal of Law and Economics , 24, 461–483. Grossman, S. J. et O. D. Hart (1980) : “Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids,” Journal of Finance , 35, 323–334. Hart, S. (1985) : “Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,” Mathematics of Operations Research , 10, 117–153. Koessler, F. et F. Forges (2006) : “Transmission strat´ egique de l’information et certification,” THEMA Working Paper 2006–04.
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Transmission strat´ egique de l’information / Information non certifiable Kreps, D. M. et J. Sobel (1994) : “Signalling,” dans Handbook of Game Theory , ed. par R. J. Aumann et S. Hart, Elsevier Science B. V., vol. 2, chap. 25, 849–867. Krishna, V. et J. Morgan (2004) : “The Art of Conversation : Eliciting Information from Experts through Multi-Stage Communication,” Journal of Economic Theory , 117, 147–179. Melumad, N. D. et T. Shibano (1991) : “Communication in Settings with no Transfers,” Rand Journal of Economics , 22, 173–198. Milgrom, P. (1981) : “Good News and Bad News : Representation Theorems and Applications,” Bell Journal of Economics , 12, 380–391. Milgrom, P. et J. Roberts (1986) : “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,” Rand Journal of Economics , 17, 18–32. Myerson, R. B. (1991) : Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict , Harvard University Press. Okuno-Fujiwara, A., M. Postlewaite, et K. Suzumura (1990) : “Strategic Information Revelation,” Review of Economic Studies , 57, 25–47. Radner, R. (1979) : “Rational Expectations Equilibrium : Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices,” Econometrica , 47, 655–678. Seidmann, D. J. et E. Winter (1997) : “Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages,” Econometrica , 65, 163–169. Spence, A. M. (1973) : “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics , 87, 355–374. Watson, J. (1996) : “Information Transmission when the Informed Party is Confused,” Games and Economic Behavior , 12, 143–161.
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