51 Vetter v Morgan 1995 YES ASSAULT GaitherMorgan swerved into Vetters lane

51 vetter v morgan 1995 yes assault gaithermorgan

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Vetter v. Morgan (1995) YES ASSAULT Gaither&Morgan swerved into Vetter’s lane (threat remove from car, spit on window) threatening words are sufficient where they are accompanied by conduct or circumstances creating a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. Words Alone Doctrine - Ordinary words NOT assault. Words can constitute assault if : THREAT: Words + acts = apprehension of imminent harm or offensive contact w/ person – hearer must have reasonable belief that contact is imminent Aiding and Abetting : “encourage, incite, and help carry the act out” Halberstam v. Welch Transferred Intent by mistake strikes third person – guilty of assault/battery on third person ** NO transferred intent in IIED ** In re White (1982) *liable for injury of third party *cannot file for bankruptcy YES TRANSFERRED INTENT RULE: A debt resulting from an intentional wrongful act that causes injury is not dischargeable in bankruptcy , even if the person injured was not the same person whom the debtor intended to harm. Nelson v. Carroll : sometimes transferred intent is invoked to address a situation in which the D intends victim to suffer one kind of prohibited consequence but ends up causing that victim to suffer a different kind of consequence that is also prohibited as long as you have an intent to assault, whatever flows from that leaves you liable. Transferred intent: across victims : victims of certain acts that were intended to injure someone else may sue even though they were not among the persons whom the D intended to injure FALSE IMPRISONMENT intentional infliction of a confinement R2D §33 as long as D held the necessary intent with respect to one person, D will be held to have committed an intentional tort against any other person who happens to be injured Four Versions I. Same victim, different intentional tort ( Nelson v. Carrol ) Intended to assault of P battery of P II. Different victim, same intentional tort ( In re White ) Intended battery of A battery of P III. Different victim, different intentional tort ( In re White ) Intended assault of A battery of P IV. From things to persons? ( Lynn v. Burnette ) Intent to harm chattel battery of P? In order to establish P.F. case - π must establish that someone of ordinary firmness would feel the same fear. Rule: Doctrine of Transferred Intent : one who intends a battery is liable for that battery when he unexpectedly hits a stranger instead of the intended victim – not essential that the injury be to the one intended. ELEMENTS OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT: 1. A willful detention, 2. Without consent, and 3. Without authority of law Randall’s Foot Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, (1996.) 52
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Tortfeasor causes victim to be within a bounded physical space Can occur absent impossibility of departure (1) available exit, but use poses risk of physical harm (2) victim believes tortfeasor will prevent her from leaving Confinement : occurs when victim within a bounded physical space; can be non-stationary P burden of proving D acted with
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