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Vetter v. Morgan(1995) YES ASSAULTGaither&Morgan swerved into Vetter’s lane (threat remove from car, spit on window) threatening wordsare sufficientwhere they are accompanied by conductor circumstances creating a reasonable apprehensionof imminent harmful or offensive contact.Words Alone Doctrine- Ordinary words NOT assault. Words can constitute assault if: THREAT: Words + acts = apprehension of imminent harm or offensive contact w/ person – hearer musthave reasonable belief that contact is imminent Aiding and Abetting: “encourage, incite, and help carry the act out” Halberstam v. Welch Transferred Intent by mistake strikes third person – guilty of assault/batteryon third person **NOtransferred intent in IIED** In re White(1982) *liable for injury of third party *cannot file for bankruptcyYES TRANSFERRED INTENTRULE: A debtresulting from an intentional wrongfulact that causes injury is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, even iftheperson injured was not the same person whom the debtor intended to harm.Nelson v. Carroll: sometimes transferred intent is invoked to address a situation in which the D intends victim to suffer one kind of prohibited consequence but ends up causing that victim to suffer a different kind of consequence that is also prohibited as long as you have an intent to assault, whatever flows from that leaves you liable. Transferred intent: across victims: victims of certain acts that were intended to injure someone else may sue even though they were not among the persons whom the D intended to injure FALSE IMPRISONMENTintentional infliction of a confinement R2D §33 as long as D held the necessary intent with respect to one person, D will be held to have committed an intentional tort against any other person who happens to be injured Four Versions I.Same victim, different intentional tort (Nelson v. Carrol) Intended to assault of P battery of P II.Different victim, same intentional tort (In re White) Intended battery of A battery of P III.Different victim, different intentional tort (In re White) Intended assault of A battery of P IV.From things to persons? (Lynn v. Burnette) Intent to harm chattel battery of P? In order to establish P.F. case - π must establish that someone of ordinary firmnesswould feel the same fear.Rule:Doctrine of Transferred Intent: one who intends a battery is liable for that battery when he unexpectedly hits a stranger instead of the intended victim – not essential that the injury be to the one intended.ELEMENTS OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT: 1.A willful detention,2.Without consent, and 3.Without authority of lawRandall’s Foot Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, (1996.)52
Tortfeasor causes victim to be within aboundedphysical space Canoccur absent impossibility of departure (1) available exit, but use poses risk of physical harm(2) victim believes tortfeasor will prevent her from leavingConfinement: occurs when victim within a bounded physical space; can be non-stationary P burden of proving D acted with