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Governor’s duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, thatcompetent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public topass wise and proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could singlehimself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The second kind coversthose who perform duties to an individual by reason of their employment by aparticular person to do some act for him in an official capacity. They usually receivetheir compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in serving civil processfor a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording a deed or mortgage in favor of aprivate individual, a notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc.When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual can haveno cause of action for damages against the public officer. The exception to this is ifthe individual suffers a particular or special injuryon account of the public officer’simproper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into the rule that anindividual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an actor omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong orinjury to the former. A public officer like Chato, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes aduty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements ofvalid admin regulations. It’s a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entirepublic who would be affected by such rule. Note that in CIR v. CA, the RMC was not declared unconstitutional for violating thedue process requirement or the equal protection clause. Court only said that the RMCdid not meet the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune relies heavily onthat case as its cause of action. It shows therefore that it really has no cause of actionfor failing to show its allegation that Chato violated Art. 32. Fortune failed to show thatit incurred some particularwrong or injury.Finally, Sec. 227 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 provides:“Satisfaction of JudgmentRecovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. – When an action is brought againstany Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in theperformance of official duty…any judgment, damages or costs recovered in suchaction shall be satisfied by the Commissioner…. No such judgment, damages orcosts shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently orin bad faith, or with willful oppression.” Because the respondent’s complaint does notimpute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial courtagainst her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, thecomplaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.
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Law, Supreme Court of the United States, Appellate court, DEAN DEL CASTILLO