Further reading - An excellent review of topics of relationship and trust in negotiation is an excerpt from Establishing trust and building a relationship from Thompson, The mind and heart of the negotiator (Pearson 2012). - Shapiro, Sheppard, Cheraskin, Business on a Handshake - Mcallister, Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations - Welsh, The Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students X begets X WAMAP provides a challenging counter to those who believe that one should start the negotiatin by being hard, then become more cooperative: Xs beget Xs; once that pattern is established it is hard to break. Cooperation vs. Competition
The monetary variation tends to be dramatic between cooperative and competitive games, and analysis usually suggests that to establish the former, some teams have to take a risk. Players face the tension between seeking high short-term gains and low short-term risk inherent in a competitive strategy, and lower but more stable long-term gains inherent in a cooperative strategy. Further reading Negotiating Through Action, from Bazerman, Neale, Negotiating Rationally (Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1993). Axelrod, Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, Science, New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4489 (Mar. 27, 1981) , pp. 1390-1396 Axelrod, Dion, The Further Evolution of Cooperation, Science , New Series, Vol. 242, No. 4884 (Dec. 9, 1988) , pp. 1385-1390 Good outcome - 7 elements framework Good Outcome Under the principled negotiation model, a good outcome of a negotiation is no deal, or a deal that is: 1. better than your best alternative to the negotiated agreement; 2. satisfies interests (yours: well, counterparty's: acceptably well, relevant third parties: tolerably well); 3. is the best of all possible value creating options (ie. is Pareto-efficient); 4. results in commitment that is practical, durable, clear, enforceable, verifiable; 5. at the very least, does not harm the relationship; 6. is a result of clear unambigous communication; and 7. is legitimate, i.e. is based on objective criteria rather than sheer willpower of the parties. An excellent summary: article by Bruce Patton. Distributing value: distributive bargaining and objective criteria Distributive Issues 1. Distributive aspect of negotiation . Zero-sum bargaining is part of virtually every negotiation. Reservation values of parties determine the bargaining zone, or zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), within which any agreement is better than both parties’ best alternatives. If ZOPA is positive, any deal is rationally preferable to no deal. 2. Information asymmetry and strategic moves . Parties negotiate under information asymmetry, and exchange information guided by strategic considerations. A party's attempts at claiming by shaping the counterparty's perceptions of what is possible carry a chance of successful distributive outcome as well as a risk of an impasse where ZOPA is positive.
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