with more stable configurations when two families marry off several of their

With more stable configurations when two families

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with more stable configurations when two families marry off several of their children, as they have more leeway to rearrange the aggregate surplus among them. This helps explain why the practice of watta-satta , a bride exchange involving the simultaneous marriage of a brother-sister pair from two households, is common in some developing u i 1 = 6 , u i 2 = 6 support the efficient assignment as family-stable, but not as individual-stable. 18
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countries (Jacoby and Mansuri 2010). Thus, we find that for a given efficient assignment, families would accept some sharings- out of surplus its members would never accept if they were acting alone. As a conse- quence, our model predicts that arranged marriage could leave the assignment itself unaffected while greatly changing the surplus-sharing accepted by the married children. This result may have drastic implications ex ante in terms of premarital investment, in particular for the education of daughters. Moreover, it implies that in some societies, we may observe assignments that are predicted by one-to-one matching models but for which the sharing of surplus within the household is unexplained by classical theory. Our extension helps explain these situations. Overall, we find that family partitioning determines the properties of family-stable matchings. For some family partitions, we may observe inefficient outcomes. As ex- plained above, this seems to be the case when the distribution of sons and daughters is not uniform across families or when there is heterogeneity in families’ size. For certain other family partitions, we may observe only efficient outcomes but drastic differences in terms of the size of the set of shares supporting them. For some family partitions, any sharing-out of aggregate surplus across families supports the efficient assignment as family-stable, as we illustrated with F 2 and more broadly for all partitions that divide the population into two families. For others, the set is smaller and even the same as that obtained under individual decision-making: this is straightforward for the family partition that partitions the population into single individuals, for instance. Less trivially, this is also the case when each family is composed of one son and one daughter. It seems that the more competition between families, the smaller the set of shares supporting the efficient outcomes, as shown in Figure 5. For a population of three men and three women, we observe how the family partition affects the set of shares of surplus that support the efficient assignment ( μ * ) i 1 - j 2 , i 2 - j 3 , i 3 - j 1 . We thus assume that π 12 + π 23 + π 31 maximizes the sum of total marital surplus over all possible assignments 23 . Shaded volumes represent the set of shares of surplus that 23 We also assume π 12 + π 31 π 11 + π 32 , otherwise μ * would not hold as family-stable in family 19
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support μ * as family-stable. When volumes are in several colors, the set of shares of surplus supporting μ * as family-stable is the intersection of these volumes.
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  • Spring '10
  • JAMES
  • J2, family dimension

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