Dastur 2007 113 my translation deleuze seems to use

(Dastur 2007: 113; my translation)
Deleuze seems to use the expression ‘ un air du temps ’ in a very
similar way to this Heideggerian notion of Stimmung , as a manner
of doing philosophy in tune with its contemporary times. As Dastur
quotes from Heidegger’s first lectures on Nietzsche, ‘ Stimmung is
precisely the fundamental manner according to which we are exterior
to ourselves’ (Dastur 2007: 117; my translation). It is this spirit
of the time that shatters the constituted subject and presents the
possibility to individuate, to compose with the world as psycho-
collective individuations. For both Heidegger and Deleuze, Stimmung
and air du temps are ontological formations rather than psychological
perceptions. For both, yet very differently, an image of thought reflects a
present, challenging all forms of doing philosophy by inscribing in them
a political imperative, and opening thoughts and politics to other realms
as the means to a process of transindividuation. 7 In short, thinking is
a dangerous and a transformative activity. In order to bring to the
fore the political elements contained in this untimely question ‘what
is called thinking?’, it is necessary to think the present against eternal
and ahistorical truths. As we may recall here, Foucault claimed that this
thought of actuality was first expressed in modern times by Kant, in
What Is Enlightenment? as an attempt to answer the question: ‘what is
it in the present that currently has meaning for philosophical reflection?’

What Is Called Thinking? Deleuze on Heideggerian Paths 255
(Foucault 2010: 12). Before coming back to the historical determination
of thinking (especially in relation to nihilism), we should first turn to
the question of the role of signs in shaping the involuntary practice of
thinking.
II. The Thinking Path: A Typology of Signs and Thinking as
an Involuntary Practice
One of the key themes running throughout Heidegger’s lectures on
thinking is the process of learning. The emphasis on learning is crucial
to understanding the objectives of the book, and as the translator notes
in his introduction, Heidegger’s 1951–2 lectures on What Is Called
Thinking? were the first he had been allowed to deliver since his
suspension in 1944 for his involvement with the Nazi regime (Glenn
Gray in Heidegger 1968: xviii). Here, Heidegger claims that
in order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first. What is
learning? . . . We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think
about . . . Everything thought-provoking gives us to think . . . [What is] [ most ]
thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking . (Heidegger 1968: 4;
original emphasis)
This last sentence is referred to again and again by Deleuze. For
Heidegger, if thinking is a human faculty, it does not mean that we are
currently thinking. This is the first argument Heidegger presents, that
thinking is not an innate faculty but a process to be acquired over time,
through a process of learning. In fact, one cannot find what thinking is
or what there is to think if one does not attempt to find the ‘path’ to
thinking (Heidegger 1969: 23).