Dastur 2007 113 my translation Deleuze seems to use the expression un air du

Dastur 2007 113 my translation deleuze seems to use

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(Dastur 2007: 113; my translation) Deleuze seems to use the expression ‘ un air du temps ’ in a very similar way to this Heideggerian notion of Stimmung , as a manner of doing philosophy in tune with its contemporary times. As Dastur quotes from Heidegger’s first lectures on Nietzsche, ‘ Stimmung is precisely the fundamental manner according to which we are exterior to ourselves’ (Dastur 2007: 117; my translation). It is this spirit of the time that shatters the constituted subject and presents the possibility to individuate, to compose with the world as psycho- collective individuations. For both Heidegger and Deleuze, Stimmung and air du temps are ontological formations rather than psychological perceptions. For both, yet very differently, an image of thought reflects a present, challenging all forms of doing philosophy by inscribing in them a political imperative, and opening thoughts and politics to other realms as the means to a process of transindividuation. 7 In short, thinking is a dangerous and a transformative activity. In order to bring to the fore the political elements contained in this untimely question ‘what is called thinking?’, it is necessary to think the present against eternal and ahistorical truths. As we may recall here, Foucault claimed that this thought of actuality was first expressed in modern times by Kant, in What Is Enlightenment? as an attempt to answer the question: ‘what is it in the present that currently has meaning for philosophical reflection?’
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What Is Called Thinking? Deleuze on Heideggerian Paths 255 (Foucault 2010: 12). Before coming back to the historical determination of thinking (especially in relation to nihilism), we should first turn to the question of the role of signs in shaping the involuntary practice of thinking. II. The Thinking Path: A Typology of Signs and Thinking as an Involuntary Practice One of the key themes running throughout Heidegger’s lectures on thinking is the process of learning. The emphasis on learning is crucial to understanding the objectives of the book, and as the translator notes in his introduction, Heidegger’s 1951–2 lectures on What Is Called Thinking? were the first he had been allowed to deliver since his suspension in 1944 for his involvement with the Nazi regime (Glenn Gray in Heidegger 1968: xviii). Here, Heidegger claims that in order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first. What is learning? . . . We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about . . . Everything thought-provoking gives us to think . . . [What is] [ most ] thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking . (Heidegger 1968: 4; original emphasis) This last sentence is referred to again and again by Deleuze. For Heidegger, if thinking is a human faculty, it does not mean that we are currently thinking. This is the first argument Heidegger presents, that thinking is not an innate faculty but a process to be acquired over time, through a process of learning. In fact, one cannot find what thinking is or what there is to think if one does not attempt to find the ‘path’ to thinking (Heidegger 1969: 23).
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  • Spring '19
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  • Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze

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