evaluate this variable and may well reduce the willingness of Sunni Arabs to join with us and, more importantly, to rejoin Iraq and Syria. Developing a strategy that has a chance of success requires identifying the center of gravity of the overarching regional problem — the struggle within the Sunni Arab community itself amidst the collapse of state structures in the Middle East.
Paradigm Research PF April—ISIL A2: Iran Operations are far away from Iranian border Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War , Kagan, director of the Critical Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly, Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State, , p. 26) Iran may perceive intervention as a re-invasion to position U.S. forces to attack Iran in the event of the failure of nuclear negotiations and may respond with regional attacks. The geographic focus of U.S. efforts may provide Tehran some reassurance, since they will be focused in northern and western Iraq away from the Iranian border. But the U.S. should also consider supplying its Gulf allies with additional defensive capabilities to deter any such Iranian response or render it ineffective if deterrence fails.
Paradigm Research PF April—ISIL A2: Long Time Frame Slow operations are more effective. Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow & Director Military & Security Studies Program @ Washington Institute; November 2014 (Michael; Policy Notes; No. 20; “Defeating ISIS: A strategy for a resilient adversary and an intractable conflict”; - resilient-adversary-and-an-intractable-conf) This argues for an “anaconda strategy” that slowly, methodically squeezes ISIS from all directions, in both Iraq and Syria, and along multiple lines of operation, rather than the kind of rapid, decisive operations the United States aspired to in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. (A key lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq is that decisive operations that lead to the enemy’s rapid collapse but not its defeat in detail often create more problems than they solve. In particular, such operations may cause enemy fighters to go to ground — only to return as insurgents, or to destabilize neighboring states where they have taken refuge. More force does not necessarily yield better military results.)
Paradigm Research PF April—ISIL A2: Terrorism The risk terrorists buildup in Iraq and Syria outweigh the risk of bring Al-Qaeda and ISIS together. Kagan, founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War, Kagan, director of the Critical Threat Project at the American Enterprise Institute, and Lewis, research director, Sept. 2014 (Kimberly, Frederick, and Jessica, A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State, , p. 26) A US intervention could drive JN and ISIS to bury the hatchet and join forces. It could also spur attacks from other al-Qaeda affiliates. This risk is outweighed by the much
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- Spring '12
- The American, ISIS, United States armed forces, Iraqi Army