This is an interesting step and captures the essence of Heideggers argument

This is an interesting step and captures the essence

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disposable, aren’t we?’’ This is an interesting step and captures the essence of Heidegger’s argument against western metaphysics which is humanistic and in which everything is valued in human terms and subsequently everything (also humanity) is robbed of its worth: [I]t is important finally to realise that precisely through the characterisation of something as ‘a value’ what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for man’s estimation. But what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing . It does no let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects of its doing (Heidegger 1977a, p. 228, emphasis mine). In this regard, neither Riker nor Picard escape this anthropocentric valuing. Riker argues that machines are instruments of [hu]man, at its disposal. They should be valued in terms of their value ‘for us.’ However, in the sociotechnical assemblages of contemporary world, it is increasingly difficult to draw a clear boundary between ‘them’ and ‘us.’ If they are merely ‘for us’, then we all are a ‘for us’ . As Heidegger (1977b) argues in his essay The Question Concerning Technology, in such a world we all become ‘standing reserve’ (at the disposal of the network). Picard’s humanistic defence invokes a hierarchy of values in which Data becomes valued because he is ‘like us’ (sentient beings). However, if Heidegger is right then even where valuing is positive it is always subjectivising. Thus, neither of these positions escape the ‘technological’ world view in which the world is rendered present as a ‘for us’ (Gestell/enframed in Heidegger’s terminology). As enframed beings not only the artificial but also [hu]man becomes mere ‘standing reserve’ within which other possibilities for being are concealed . Not only this. In framing beings (and itself) in its own terms the very concealing of other possibilities for being itself becomes concealed. Instead of creating value systems in our own self-image, the absolute otherness of every Other should be the only moral imperative, so argues Levinas and Derrida. We need an ethics of the artificial that is beyond the self-identical of human beings. Such an ethics beyond anthropocentric metaphysics need as its ‘ground’, not a system for comparison, but rather a recognition of the impossibility of any comparison—every comparison is already violent in its attempt to render equal what could never be equa l (Levinas 1991[1974]). How might we encounter the other, ethically, in its otherness? This is what I will no turn to.
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Tool The 1AC uses ______ as a tool which withdrawals the object from having interactions with other entities because it is just seen as a tool.
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