day of trial was not involuntary when the offer had been available for months].)
A defendant cannot withdraw the plea because of “buyer’s remorse.”
(
In re Brown
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 686;
People v. Knight
(1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344.)
“The rule that
a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to
later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his
decision. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long
after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's
19
case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.”
(
Brady v. United States
(1970) 397 U.S. 742, 757.)
A “plea’s validity may not be collaterally attacked merely
because the defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal.
See
Brady,
397
U.S., at 757;
Mabry v. Johnson
, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984).
Rather, the shortcomings of the
deal . . . cast doubt on the validity of his plea only if they show either that he made the
unfavorable plea on the constitutionally defective advice of counsel, see
Tollett v.
Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), or that he could not have understood the terms of the
plea bargain . . . . ”
(
Bradshaw v. Stumpf
(2005) 545 U.S. 175, 186.)
b.
Misrepresentations
If the defendant can prove the court did not properly advise him or her of the
constitutional rights and the direct consequences of the plea, and the defendant can show he
or she would not have pled had there been a proper advisement, the remedy is to permit the
defendant to withdraw the plea.
(
People v. Walker
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1020, 1022-
1023.)
A plea is coerced because of an illusory promise.
(
People v. Collins
(2001) 26
Cal.4th 297, 309;
People v. Lamb
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 664;
People v. Hollins
(1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 567, 571-575;
People v. Bowie
(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1263;
People v. Truman
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1820-1821.)
c.
Improper plea agreements
Admission to the delinquency petition was erroneously compelled when the minor
did so in order to be placed on informal probation because an admission was not statutorily
required for the program.
(
Ricki J. v. Superior Court
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 783, 792.)
A plea was invalid when the judge actively negotiated the plea bargain to the extent
that the defendant believed he could not receive a fair trial.
(
People v. Weaver
(2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 131, 146-148; but see
People v. Dixon
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 985, 993
[promise of the court to consider an early plea as a factor in mitigation was not coercive
since defendant did not plead until later].)
A plea bargain requiring defendant to go to Iraq was void.
(
Alhusainy v. Superior
Court
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 385, 391-393.)
d.
Lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights
A court can rely heavily on the defendant’s statements when he entered the plea that
20
he understood and the trial court’s findings that the defendant’s plea was made knowingly
and voluntarily.
(
Blackledge v. Allison
(1977) 431 U.S. 63, 74.)
Defendant was allowed to withdraw his plea because of late discovery which
materially changed the outlook of the case.
(
In re Miranda
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 575-582
[prosecution withheld
Brady
material that another person confessed to the murder and was
