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majorpower threats to U.S. security weakened U.S. alliances. It should also be notedthat China is much more integrated into the international economy, includingimportantly via the WTO, than the Soviet Union ever was. Whether China’seconomic inclusion is a net positive for the UnitedStates remains an openquestion, but it certainly strengthens the economic pillar of the LIO.Third, framing analysis of U.S. policy in terms of the LIO builds in asigniªcant status quo bias. Much of the discussion of the LIO starts fromthe premise that it is desirable and needs to be preserved.95During periodsInternational Security 43:4 8295. Porter, “A World Imagined,” pp. 15–18. of signiªcant change in the distribution of power, however, the UnitedStates should be reconsidering whether to preserve its international commit-ments and exploring how best to achieve its fundamental interests in the de-cades ahead.96Fourth, by viewing the LIO as an unalloyed good, U.S. leaders risk failing toappreciate fully that adversaries of the United States view central pillars of theLIO—its alliances, in particular—as a source of competition and threat. For ex-ample, the LIO perspective contributed to U.S. enthusiasm for expandingNATO eastward to spread democracy, while giving too little weight to Russia’sunderstanding of expansion’s negative implications. Similarly, it likely con-tributes to U.S. underappreciation of the threat that the U.S.-Japan alliance, es-pecially the broadening of Japan’s responsibilities in the alliance, poses toChina. These U.S. misperceptions increase the probability that the UnitedStates will misinterpret adversaries’ policies byfailing to understand them asreactions to threatening U.S. policies.The LIO’s status quo bias and its contribution to these U.S. misperceptionsare potentially dangerous, because they encourage the United States to exag-gerate the threats it faces and to pursue unduly competitive policies. FramingChina as a threat to the LIO reºects and combines both of these dangers, andthereby unnecessarily aggravates U.S.-China relations.97For all of these reasons, scholars and policymakers should use LIO terminol-ogy, at most, for descriptive purposes. The LIO would simply refer to the inter-national situation, including the key international institutions, the rules thatsupport them, and the regime types of its members. It would not imply desir-ability or the ability to generate, even contribute to, speciªc international out-comes, beyond those generated by its individual elements. Even this usage hasdisadvantages, among others that there is no agreement on which elements theLIO includes. LIO fails – biggest states force others to complyGlaser 19 (Charles Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He directs the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, April 29 2019, A Flawed Framework. Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided, tkk)