It is very easy to become drawn in by the realist premise regarding a military

It is very easy to become drawn in by the realist

This preview shows page 182 - 184 out of 256 pages.

It is very easy to become drawn in by the realist premise regarding a military-build, but to pigeon-hole China’s military-build is for the most part ignoring the complexity of the situation . Similarly, I will examine the US-Japan alliance, focusing my evaluation on both China’s reaction and handling of the relationship since the mid 1990s. I will outline the reasons for China’s concern, but I will be sure to dedicate much effort into unraveling China’s benign regional ambitions regarding the trilateral relationship.
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Offensive realism constructs a violent, Chinese rise as inevitable – it posits violent geopolitical strategies as the only solution Whyte, MA IR, ’13 (Alexander, Bristol University, E-International Relations, “ Interpreting the Rise of China ,” - ir.info/2013/02/13/interpreting-the-rise-of-china/) Offensive realism breaks away from defensive realism, dividing structural realism into two. Although the two positions roughly start from the same set of bedrock assumptions, they arrive at fundamentally divergent conclusions about the nature of international politics . Where defensive realists such as Glaser and Kaufman believe that the offence-defence balance can favour the defender, providing the defending state with security, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism supports a system in which states seek security by intentionally decreasing the security of others (Glaser & Kaufmann, 1998). As prominent offensive realist, John Mearsheimer, argues that all great powers have some offensive military capability and no state can know the future intentions of the other with certainty . Mearsheimer (2006) has presented an explicit argument that the rise of China will not be peaceful. As China’s impressive economic growth continues over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in deep security competition with considerable potential for war (Mearsheimer, 2006, p.160).In a debate with Brzezinksi, Mearsheimer (2005) suggested that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. Mearsheimer (2005) understands the United States to not tolerate peer competitors. The United States is determined to remain the world’s only regional hegemon, and will seek to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of dominating Asia (Mearsheimer & Brzezinksi, 2005, pp.2-4). Mearsheimer’s voice sends ripples throughout the scholarly and policy-making world of IR as he sends the most worrisome message to the United States and any other status-quo power. Kirshner (2010) argues that Mearsheimer’s offensive realist perspective is wrong and dangerous. Mearsheimer argues that ‘if states want to survive, they should always act like good offensive realists’ (Mearsheimer, 2011, p.11-12). Moreover, according to Mearsheimer, the ideal situation is to be there hegemon in the system (Mearsheimer, 2011, cited in Kirshner, 2010, p.61).
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  • Winter '16
  • Jeff Hannan
  • International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, Infrastructure Investment Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

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