relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed to the public office. Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed as a state prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice who had administrative supervision over him under the law, and not to this Court in the guise of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis , and the proceeding thereon should focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue membership in the Bar. ( Flores-Salado v. Villanueva , A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016) The power of justices and judges of lower courts to investigate and recommend to the Supreme Court the necessary disciplinary action is well recognized. xxx. The same principle applies why the CTA, through the procedure laid down in its EROD, is allowed to investigate and recommend appropriate disciplinary measures against erring employees. In administrative complaints involving grave offenses, the role of the CTA (through the designated hearing committee) is confined to the investigation of the case, and the recommendation of the appropriate disciplinary action. Consistent with existing rules, this Court receives the Formal Investigation Report, which we can affirm, reverse, or modify based on our independent judgment. ( Escano v. Manaois , A.M. No. 16-02-01-CTA, November 15, 2016) Decisions Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. ( Dela Peña v. Court of Appeals , 598 Phil. 862, 975 ) The standard "expected of the judiciary" is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs. ( Bernabe v. Geraldez , 160 Phil. 102, 104 ) Judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless, concisely written such as they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express, at least in minimum essence, its factual and legal bases. ( Chung v.