For moral relevance ratings explicit political

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remained a significant predictor for all foundations (| |s.26 to.34, allps.001) except Ingroup (| |.05,ns), and implicitpolitical identity showed some incremental predictive validity(above and beyond explicit political identity) for the bindingfoundations (| |s.10 to .15, allps.05) but not for theindividualizing foundations (| |s.05,ns).We expected that implicit political identity would show strongerincremental validity beyond explicit political identity in predictingmoral judgments, as applications of moral intuitions and reasonsrather than self-theories about moral judgment. Both implicit andexplicit political identity showed incremental predictive validityover the other for all five foundations (| |s.16 to .52, allps.001). This is particularly impressive considering that implicit andexplicit political identities were strongly correlated, leaving sub-stantially reduced independent variance for prediction in the si-multaneous models. Implicit political identity was a stronger si-multaneous predictor of judgments than of relevance assessmentsfor all five foundations.DiscussionStudy 2 replicated the political differences in moral relevanceratings observed in Study 1 and extended support of the moralfoundations hypothesis to concrete moral judgments. Liberals weremore concerned than conservatives about issues of Harm andFairness, whereas conservatives were more concerned than liberalsabout issues related to Ingroup, Authority, and Purity. Also, forboth moral relevance and moral judgments, the effects were ob-served across both explicit and implicit political identities. Asbefore, we found a convergence pattern in which liberals made abig distinction between the individualizing and binding founda-tions, whereas conservatives—particularly strong conservatives—weighted the two kinds of concerns more or less equally (seeFigure 3). Interestingly, implicit political identity contributedunique predictive validity beyond that of self-reported politicalidentity for the moral judgments measure (all five foundations) butdid so more weakly for the moral relevance measure (and only forthe binding foundations). This suggests that moral judgments areinfluenced by more than explicit self-theories of moral relevance.Asking someone their political identity was largely sufficient for1035THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS
predicting what they said would be relevant to them in making moraljudgments, but measuring their implicit political identity addeduniquely predictive validity for moral judgments themselves.Study 3: Moral Trade-OffsIn Study 3, we adapted Tetlock’s work on sacred values andtaboo trade-offs (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green,& Lerner, 2000) to make moral judgments more personal andvisceral than they had been in Studies 1 and 2. Tetlock et al.

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