The registrar held that Percy had faile to make out his case and gave judgment

The registrar held that percy had faile to make out

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to substantiate these allegations. The registrar held that Percy had faile to make out his case and gave judgment for the widow. The Court o Appeal held this approach to be fundamentally misconceived. "On its being proved that Percy Stone had advanced a certain par of the purchase money, the presumption of law arose that he wa beneficially entitled to a corresponding share in the yacht. It was fo the plaintiff to displace that presumption by bringing evidence to th contrary; but she has entirely failed to bring any such evidence. Th Court must therefore give effect to the presumption, and must hol that, as the defendant paid a part of the purchase money, he acquire an interest in the yacht .... " 32 30 So, e.g. Bridge describes them as "presumptive rules of intention": M. Bridge, The Sale of Good (1997), p.62. 3! (1908] P. 218; (1907) 77 L.J.P. 105. 32 (1907) 77 L.J.P. 105 at 108 (Farwell L.J., giving the judgment of the court). The correspondin passage in [ 1908] P. 218 at 230, is essentially the same, though the phrase "presumption of law" rendered only as "presumption". (2008) 124 L.Q.R., JANUARY© SWEET & MAXWELL AND CONTRIBUTORS
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78 Law Quarterly Review [Vol. 124 The same view of the operation of the presumption is found in Mellish L.J.' s judgment in F owkes v Pascoe, 33 where the presumption is described as a "rule of law" which "must prevail" even though "the court might not believe that the fact was in accordance with the presumption". 34 (ii) Presumption rebutted by contrary evidence Decisions in which contrary evidence has been effective to rebut the presumption are legion. Thus, in Dyer v Dyer, Eyre C.B. said: "it is the established doctrine of a court of equity that this resulting trust may be rebutted by circumstances in evidence." 35 An example is Fawkes v Pascoe itself. 36 The facts proved by evidence were that the testatrix had an only child, a son. He predeceased her, leaving a widow, who remained living with the testatrix and who remarried from her house. The widow's son and daughter from her second marriage were treated by the testatrix as her own flesh and blood. During her lifetime, the testatrix bought a number of annuities in the joint names of herself and her surrogate grandson, by this time a young man, which annuities at the time of her death were valued at some £7,000. As the successor of joint tenants, the issue was whether the surrogate grandson held them outright or on resulting trust for the testatrix's estate. At first instance, Sir George Jessel M.R. held that a presumed resulting trust arose in favour of the testatrix's estate, which trust had not been rebutted. 37 His decision was reversed on appeal, Mellish L.J. saying: " ... if there is evidence to rebut the presumption, then ... the Court must go into the actual facts. And if we are to go into the actual facts, and look at the circumstances of this investment, it appears to me utterly impossible ... to come to any other conclusion than that the . . . investment was made for the purpose of gift and not for the purpose of trust.
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