Tibetan separatism and a desire to link Tibet
with the rest of the country – rejected Indian
territorial claims. The revelation of Chinese
road building activity in Aksai Chin – territory
claimed by India – further fanned nationalist
sentiments. A failed Tibetan rebellion,
supported by the US Central Intelligence
Agency, resulted in the Dalai Lama and many of
his followers seeking asylum in India in 1959.
These developments, amid a number of other
factors, culminated in a short but sharp Sino-
Indian border war in 1962. The result was a
humiliating defeat for India and the suspension
of normal diplomatic relations between New
Delhi and Beijing.
6
India’s tensions with China, however, also led
to a period of unprecedented collaboration
between India and the United States. Some in
Washington feared India’s fall to communism
and Chinese ascendancy in Asia. India’s Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru even turned to US
President John F. Kennedy for help during
the border war.
7
But the nascent security
cooperation came to an end with the 1965
war with Pakistan, and the United States’
suspension of support to both India and
Pakistan. In the years that followed, it was
Pakistan that emerged as more important to
US interests. Among other things, it became a
conduit for the administration of Richard Nixon
to engage with Beijing as part of its strategy to
split the seemingly monolithic Communist bloc.
There were direct costs in terms of US relations
with India. The Nixon Administration supported
Pakistan despite atrocities in what was then
East Pakistan, while condemning India’s 1971
intervention that culminated in the creation of
the new country of Bangladesh.
8
For its part,
India prepared for its intervention by signing
a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the
Soviet Union, effectively cementing an alliance
with Moscow.
After playing mediator and balancer, India
suddenly found itself an adversary of both
China and the United States. Between 1971
and 1991, India viewed both Washington and
Beijing with considerable suspicion, and
sided more explicitly with the Soviet Union in
matters of defence cooperation and diplomatic
coordination. The United States and China
were also seen as the chief external sponsors
of Pakistan, India’s regional rival. During
the 1980s, the United States and Pakistan
collaborated closely in supporting mujahideen
against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. For its
part, China transferred nuclear and missile
technology to Pakistan, activities about which
some in Washington had long been aware.
9
In
the early and mid-1980s, China also hardened
its position on the boundary dispute with India.
While earlier countenancing the possibility of
a status quo solution, Beijing became more
assertive in its claims to territory south of the
PAGE 08
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China
British-era McMahon Line, which marked the
de facto line of control.
