clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: …If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her execu tive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation. For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. — Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an invest igation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling
The Fraternal Order of St. Thomas More Constitutional Law 1 Review (2014-2015) Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Vincent Paul L. Montejo Prepared by: Mae Casador, Bianca Cezar, Joeie Domingo, Donna Flores and Jennifer Yanto Page| 378 of 521 enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition. ii. Annotations 549 SCRA 402/588 SCRA 687/619 SCRA 669 INVOKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS ONE WAY OF HIDING THE TRUTH, 549 SCRA 402(2008) § 1. Introductory, p. 402 § 2. The Broad Power of Congress of Inquiry in Aid of Legislation, p. 404 § 3. Nature and Basis of Executive Privilege, p. 405 § 4. The Policy of Public Disclosure, p. 407 § 5. The Extent of the Executive Privilege and Separation of Powers, p. 408 § 6. The Executive Privilege Usually Covers Matters Involving Foreign Relations and Military Security — Not Based on a Personal Desire, p. 409 § 7. The Three Questions Asked of Romulo Neri Involve Commercial Transaction Not Basically Public Function, p. 409 § 8. Executive Privilege may not be Invoked to Withhold Information and Disclosure of Government Transactions, p. 410 _____________________ § 1. Introductory In our annotation on the case of Francisco Chavez vs. Gonzales and NTC, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2007, 545 SCRA 596, we asked the question “What is the truth?”— we ask the same question in the Supreme Court decision in Romulo Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, et al., G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008. The three
You've reached the end of your free preview.
Want to read all 521 pages?