Revisionist overview of historiography in recent

*Revisionist*
 Overview of historiography: “ In recent times, Pearl Harbor historiography has shifted towards the
question of whether or not the Pearl Harbor attack could have been predicted through intercepted
signals. The recent prodigious output of books and articles on this subject makes it necessary to
reflect upon how the debate has developed. Some traditionalists (who believe that the Pearl Harbor
attack surprised US and Allied authorities) continue to criticize revisionists (who believe that
intercepted signals may have provided foreknowledge of the attack) …. Similar criticisms of
revisionists continue to the present day, but such criticisms are unfounded as relevant evidence
concerning pre-Pearl Harbor signals intelligence, drawn from both archival and anecdotal sources,
suggests that the revisionist thesis merits further scholarly attention.”
 Traditionalists: “ According to traditionalists, Allied-American decryption of Japanese diplomatic and
naval codes yielded no warning of the impending attack. In support of traditionalist claims, several
American and British official war histories state categorically that neither the principal Japanese
diplomatic code … nor the … Japanese naval code … offered advance warning of Japan’s intention to
attack Pearl Harbor. ”

o “ Considering 1941 eye-witness accounts … the thesis that Allied officials had the ability to
predict a Pearl Harbor attack is one that some traditionalists may accept. Yet they will
correctly note that the case for specific foreknowledge is based mainly upon post-war
accounts. For traditionalists, multiple post-war sources are not enough to support the
revisionist position. They will nonetheless have to explain why several participants in
wartime intelligence and covert operations made such claims, all quite indepen dently…. It is
clear that an entire class of evidence cannot simply be ignored in support of a
traditionalist thesis. ”
 Revisionists: “ Revisionists believe that some details concerning the Pearl Harbor attack may have
come from decrypted Japanese naval messages, although they are not certain of what was read,
considering the primary evidence that is currently available. ”
o Revisionists point to the successful theft of Japanese codebooks from the Japanese
consulate in New York as evidence that American intelligence operatives could read up-to-
date Japanese encrypted messages.
o “Furthermore, in 1941 the USN intercepted a number of Japanese naval messages that
some historians believe pointed to a Pearl Harbor attack. From September to December
1941, the USN intercepted over 26,000 Japanese naval messages of which about 90 per cent
were encrypted in JN-25B [which Wilford claims the US could decrypt]…. National Security
Agency (NSA) historian Frederick Parker observed that a number of these intercepted
messages revealed Japanese plans and training exercises concerning the North Pacific.