Other attribute we shall find the same order or one

other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that
is, the same things following in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea—for instance, of the idea of a circle,—in so far
as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply
because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate
cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to
infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the
order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of
thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must
explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so
on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God
is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.
PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be
comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of
particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.
Proof.—This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood more clearly from
the preceding note.
Corollary.—Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they
are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do
not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things

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are said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also
in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence, through
which they are said to continue.
Note.—If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I
fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here
speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as
possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within
it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite
equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to
exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be
said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us
grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two
not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they
involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.