31 The above questions are perplexing because they delve into the re

31 the above questions are perplexing because they

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31 The above questions are perplexing because they delve into the re- lationships between political thought and diplomatic action, between structure and agency, and between ideas and power. And they are just for starters. Two of the other prevalent theories about the 1970 s, shock and fracture, emphasize the lack of consensus on these and other central questions. 32 Like the interdependence thesis, they capture some of what remains an ambiguous and slippery moment, reminding us that the history of contemporary globalization is in its infancy. Like these, the work of the free market in American diplomacy toward the Third World lies in the physiological bonds of globalization, in the ways in which policymakers linked theoretical understanding to real problems as they formulated new strategies. This article proposes one new understanding of how and to what extent anti-state, pro- market ideas influenced strategy towards the Third World, in hope that others will follow. It begins with the 1973 1974 energy crisis. THE ENERGY CRISIS AS OPEC DISTORTION The crisis escalated into a number of full-scale confrontations: between the oil producers and the oil consumers, within each group, and between the First and the Third Worlds, among many others. Leaders from the OPEC nations gave special poignancy to what Kissinger called in 1969 the “North-South gap” when they argued that their actions verged on a new era of economic emancipation. 33 This interpretation drew on a long history of anti-colonialism among oil elites, which began in the early 1950 s and had become more prominent since the late 1960 s. At the same time, the growth of capitalist-world consumption, plunging levels of American production, and the growing dependence of Western Europe on Middle Eastern oil slowly and then more rapidly reformatted the global balance between supply and demand. The confluence of nationalist supply control, the economic shift from a buyer’s to a seller’s market, and the OPEC members’ col- lective policies–especially after the 1969 Libyan revolution and the 1971 Tripoli and Tehran agreements–raised the stakes of the energy crisis beyond economic concerns about the noxious effects of price increases. 34 The sense of vulnerability among the capitalist nations was acute after October 1973 , and the initial response to the energy crisis was often calamitous. “They have all the cards!” the chairman of Exxon, Ken Jamieson, exclaimed to Kissinger when 31 . Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ, 2004 ). 32 . Ferguson, et al., Shock of the Global ; Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011 ). 33 . Kissinger to Nixon, “NSC Meeting on Foreign Aid,” 25 March 1969 , NSC Institutional Files (hereafter NSCIF), H- 021 , RNPL. 34 . Christopher R. W. Dietrich, “Mossadegh Madness: Oil and Sovereignty in the Anti-Colonial Community, 1950 - 1971 ,” Humanity: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights and Humanitarianism 6 , no. 1 (Spring 2015 ): 63 - 78 .
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