31The above questions are perplexing because they delve into the re-lationships between political thought and diplomatic action, between structure andagency, and between ideas and power. And they are just for starters. Two of theother prevalent theories about the1970s, shock and fracture, emphasize the lack ofconsensus on these and other central questions.32Like the interdependence thesis,they capture some of what remains an ambiguous and slippery moment, remindingus that the history of contemporary globalization is in its infancy. Like these, thework of the free market in American diplomacy toward the Third World lies in thephysiological bonds of globalization, in the ways in which policymakers linkedtheoretical understanding to real problems as they formulated new strategies. Thisarticle proposes one new understanding of how and to what extent anti-state, pro-market ideas influenced strategy towards the Third World, in hope that others willfollow. It begins with the1973–1974energy crisis.THEENERGYCRISISASOPECDISTORTIONThe crisis escalated into a number of full-scale confrontations: between the oilproducers and the oil consumers, within each group, and between the First and theThird Worlds, among many others. Leaders from the OPEC nations gave specialpoignancy to what Kissinger called in1969the “North-South gap” when theyargued that their actions verged on a new era of economic emancipation.33Thisinterpretation drew on a long history of anti-colonialism among oil elites, whichbegan in the early1950s and had become more prominent since the late1960s. Atthe same time, the growth of capitalist-world consumption, plunging levels ofAmerican production, and the growing dependence of Western Europe onMiddle Eastern oil slowly and then more rapidly reformatted the global balancebetween supply and demand. The confluence of nationalist supply control, theeconomic shift from a buyer’s to a seller’s market, and the OPEC members’ col-lective policies–especially after the1969Libyan revolution and the1971Tripoliand Tehran agreements–raised the stakes of the energy crisis beyond economicconcerns about the noxious effects of price increases.34The sense of vulnerability among the capitalist nations was acute after October1973, and the initial response to the energy crisis was often calamitous. “They haveall the cards!” the chairman of Exxon, Ken Jamieson, exclaimed to Kissinger when31. Paul Pierson,Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis(Princeton, NJ,2004).32. Ferguson, et al.,Shock of the Global; Daniel Rodgers,Age of Fracture(Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press,2011).33. Kissinger to Nixon, “NSC Meeting on Foreign Aid,”25March1969, NSC InstitutionalFiles (hereafter NSCIF), H-021, RNPL.34. Christopher R. W. Dietrich, “Mossadegh Madness: Oil and Sovereignty in theAnti-Colonial Community,1950-1971,”Humanity: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rightsand Humanitarianism6, no.1(Spring2015):63-78.