# Pts question 5 incorrect incorrect module 3 final

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Module 3 Final Quiz: OLEO2134-OLET2135 Economic Strategy and Negotiation S2CISESweet Candy can choose to Enter (E) a market or not (N). This choiceis observed by its rival, Bubble Blue, who can then choose either to Eor N. If the actions are (E, E), where the first action is Sweet Candy’sand the second is Bubble Blue’s, the payoffs are (45, 20), where thefirst payoff accrues to Sweet Candy and the second to Bubble Blue. Ifthe actions are (E, N) the payoffs are (10, 10). If the actions are (N, E)the payoffs are (x, y). If the actions (N, N) the payoffs are (50, 15). Inthe credible (subgame perfect) equilibria, what are the possible payoffs(in whole numbers) to Sweet Candy (x) and Bubble Blue (y) for which(E, E) is the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium?
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1 / 1 ptsQuestion 6A firm’s actions that are taken to influence the beliefs or actions ofrivals in its favourable ways are
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Module 3 Final Quiz: OLEO2134-OLET2135 Economic Strategy and Negotiation S2CISE1 / 1 ptsQuestion 7Boral can choose to Enter (E) a market or not (N). This choice isobserved by its rival, CSR, who can then choose either to E or N. If theactions are (E, E), where the first action is Boral’s and the second isCSR’s, the payoffs are (35, 40), where the first payoff accrues to Boraland the second to CSR. If the actions are (E, N) the payoffs are (20,30). If the actions are (N, E) is (30, 20). If the actions (N, N) the payoffsare (20, 15). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibria, what are theaction we observe from Boral and CSR, respectively?(N, E)(E, N) or (N, E)(E, N)(E, E)None of the answers are correct
1 / 1 ptsQuestion 8Coles and Woolworths are involved in the following scenario. Coles firstchooses whether to enter a new market or not (Enter or Not Enter).Having observed this choice, Woolworths then choose whether it wouldlike to Enter or Not Enter itself. The game then ends, and the payoffsare realised. If both firms opted for Enter both firms get a payoff of 3. Ifboth firms Not Entered, the payoffs are (2, 2) for Coles andWoolworths, respectively. Finally, if one Entered and the other chooseto Not Enter, the payoffs are 1 to the firm that choice Enter and 1 to thefirm that chose Not Enter.In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium, what do we observebeing chosen by Coles and Woolworths?
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