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1266 nsdd 75 whereas nsdd 32 provided an overall

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1266NSDD 75Whereas NSDD-32 provided an overall strategic frameworkfor the Reaganadministration, NSDD-75 applied that framework specifically to the Soviet Union.Thedocument has received its share of accolades. Paul Kengor has called it “probably the mostimportant foreign-policy document by the Reagan administration, institutionalizing thepresident’s intention to undermine the Soviet communist empire.”1267NSC staffer NormanBailey has dubbed it “the strategic plan that won the Cold War.”1268The primary author ofNSDD-32, Tom Reed, called it “the blueprint for the endgame” and “a confidential declarationof economic and political war.”1269The author of NSDD 75 was Richard Pipes with the assistance of Roger Robinson.Pipes, a Polish émigré, was a professor of history at Harvard who served as the NSC’s director1264Reed,At The Abyss, p. 237.1265“National Security Strategy,” speech to be delivered by Honorable William P. Clark, Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 21 May1982, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), Box 1, OA 91311, NSDD-32,Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, National Archives and Records Administration, p. 5.1266Kengor and Doerner,The Judge, p. 167.1267Paul Kengor, “Crucial Cold War Secret,”The Washington Times, 13 January 2008.1268Norman A. Bailey,The Strategic Plan that Won the Cold War: National Security Decision Directive 75(McLean, VA, 1998).1269Kengor, “Crucial Cold War Secret.”
585for Eastern European and Soviet Affairs during the first two years of the Reagan administration;his office also included Paula Dobriansky, who would later serve as Under Secretary of State forGlobal Affairs in the George W. Bush administration, and Dennis Blair, who would rise to therank of Admiral and serve as Commander of U.S. Pacific Command and then Director ofNational Intelligence in the Barack Obama administration.1270Like Reagan, Pipes had beenarguing for years that the Soviet Union was in decline. As he later wrote, “Because Reagan knewwhat he wanted but could not articulate his feelings in terms that made sense to foreign policyprofessionals at home and aboard, I took it upon myself to do so on his behalf.”1271Pipes painted a picture of a Soviet empire stretched to its limits, vulnerable to ethnicstrife, and lacking political legitimacy.Such a view, whose veracity became apparent within adecade, was nonetheless radical in the early 1980s, and it earned him ostracism among theforeign policy community.Indeed,The Washington Postdeclared, “for rank hysteria inscholarly garb, it’s hard to top Harvard prof Richard Pipes.”1272Pipes was one of a relatively small group of people who shared the belief that the SovietUnion was structurally weak, that the Soviet elite had lost faith in the communist system, andthat the U.S.-Soviet competition was moving into areas where the Soviets could not compete.

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