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doubt that the Supreme Court has a special status in the republic and that the impact of its judgments goes well beyond the boundaries of the law and seeps into the nation’s political discourse, affecting the making of policy at every level of government. Judicial deference in national security cases rests on a dominating juristic mind driven by an unbending way of thinking that resists serious engagement over the merits of its premises. As a result, the legal doctrines that insulate the executive in cases implicating national security have expanded incrementally over many decades, gathering precedent after precedent in support of the mindset that in turn further insulates the mindset from a reexamination of its premises. This unfortunate dynamic makes it unlikely that the mindset will in fact be reconsidered before many of today’s judges leave the bench and are replaced by judges not afraid to reassess accepted premises.Congress is simply unlikely to vote to restrain presidential actionGene Healy, Vice President, Cato Institute, THE CULT OF THE PRESIDENCY: AMERICA’S DANGEROUS DEVOTION TO EXECUTIVE POWER, 2008, Washington D.C: Cato Institute, p. 271-272.The Separation of Powers Restoration Act, the Breyer proposal, and the Congressional Responsibility Act are laudable attempts to prevent the presidentfrom exercising any authority beyond what the Constitution or Congress properly entrusts him with, but each has serious flaws. By giving aggrieved legislators the right to sue, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act aims to dragoon the courts into the fight over executive orders. But legislators cannot force judges to solve Congress’s problems simply by passing a law. Federal courts rarely welcome the opportunity to sort out fights between the other two branches, and they’ve generally denied standing to legislators alleging an injury to Congress’s institutional interests. Likewise, forcing Congress to vote on significant federal rules is a noble idea, but the Breyer proposal and the Congressional Responsibility Act presuppose a Congress that’s interested in taking responsibility for the law. That is not the Congress we have, or are likely to have, anytime soon.
Courts Effective: A2 “Court Stripping”Congress only rarely exercises its power to constrain the courtJeffrey A. Segal, Distinguished Professor, Political Science, State University of New York, Stony Brook, Harold J. Spaeth, Research Professor, Law and Professor Emeritus, Political Science, Michigan State University and Sara C. Benesh, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Wisconsin,Milwaukee, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 324-325.Congress. Unlike the president, who has no control over sitting members of the Supreme Court, Congress possesses explicit constitutional power to check and balance judicial and Supreme Court decision making. Structurally, it can impeach and remove judges; it can increase or decrease the size of any federal court; and it can limit - or even terminate - the Court's appellate jurisdiction, along with all the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Thus,