Answer The third paragraph of section 33 of PD 704 creates a presumption of

Answer the third paragraph of section 33 of pd 704

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Answer: The third paragraph of section 33 of PD 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. Hizon vs. CA. On August 1991, in the Municipality of Amulung, Province of Cagayan, the said accused, Garcia and Caranguian, both armed with guns, conspiring together and helping each other, did attack, assault and shoot one Lumboy inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on his body which caused his death. Does the prosecution have to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused? Ruling: In the case before us, the prosecution presented proof that Lumboy was killed during the shooting incident on August 1, 1991. However, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
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that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing. The information given by the witnesses at the identity of appellant is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. Section 36 of Rule 130 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, the witness’ testimony is even double or multiple hearsay since it is based upon “third hand” information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay. People vs. Caranguian. On the 22nd day of December, 1991 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila the accused, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, defrauded and deceived one Dacuma; the said accused received from complainant 400 sacks of rice valued at P200,000.00 and in payment thereof accused Dizon issued in favor of said complainant checks when accused knew fully well at the time that they have no sufficient funds in the bank and would not have such funds even on the date stated on the face thereof and upon presentment of such checks to the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Does the presumption of innocence of accused-
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