Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed-as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts. The Act’s restrictions are incompatible with the Constitution’s separation of powers. … D While we have sustained in certain cases limits on the President’s removal power, the Act before us imposes a new type of restriction-two levels of protection from removalfor those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot limit thePresident’s authority in this way. It is so ordered. Justice BREYER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting. [I]n my view the statute does not significantly interfere with the President’s “executive Power.” It violates no separation-of-powers principle. And the Court’s contrary holding threatens to disrupt severely the fair and efficient administration of the laws. I consequently dissent. … [J]udges should hesitate before second-guessing a “for cause” decision made by the other branches. Compared to Congress and the President, the Judiciary possesses an inferior understanding of the realities of administration, and the manner in which power, including and most especially political power, operates in context. There is no indication that the two comparatively more expert branches were divided in their support for the “for cause” provision at issue here. In this case, the Act embodying the provision was passed by a vote of 423 to 3 in the House of Representatives and a by vote of 99 to 0 in the Senate. … The President signed the Act. [Our] decision should take account of the Judiciary’s comparative lack of institutional expertise. … Congress and the President had good reason for enacting the challenged “for cause” provision. First and foremost, the Board adjudicates cases. This Court has long recognized the appropriateness of using “for cause” provisions to protect the personal independence of those who even only sometimes engage in adjudicatory functions.Indeed, as early as 1789 James Madison stated that “there may be strong reasons why an” executive “officer” such as the Comptroller of the United States “should not hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch” if one of his “principal dut[ies]” “partakes strongly of the judicial character.” Moreover, in addition to their adjudicative functions, the Accounting Board members supervise, and are themselves, technical professional experts.This Court has recognized that the “difficulties involved in the preparation of” sound auditing reportsrequire the application of “scientific accounting principles.” And this Court has recognized the constitutional legitimacy of a justification that rests agency independence upon the need for technical expertise.