things can be lost, because they have not always been hereand will not always be here, that we value them.Thisargument is one aspect of my notion of the unconditional affirmation of survival.A recurrent question in the responses concerns the exact status of this affirmation, so I want to be very clear on this point. Contrary to what Adrian Johnston holds in his paper, I am not proposing a life-affirming atheism. Rather, I argue that the affirmation of survival is presupposed in all responses to life. Without the affirmation of survival there would be no compassion and love (since one would not be committed to anything), but there would also be no resentment and hate (since one wouldnot be threatened by anything).Even the most suicidal desire to endall survival presupposes the affirmation of survival, since one would not care to end all survival if one did notcare about what will happenand thus cared about survival.The only way to be truly indifferent to survival is to be dead, which is to say that it is impossible for a living being to be indifferent to survival. This is the exact sense of the unconditional affirmation of survival. It spells out that whatever one does one is invested in the fate of a mortal temporal being. If one were not invested in the fate of a mortal, temporal being, one would not be invested in the fate of anything at all, since one would not care about anything that has happened or anything that may happen.Thus, I argue that affectivity in general presupposes the care for survival. If one does not care for survival, one does not care about what happens. And if one does not care about what happens, one is not affected. In my work on psychoanalysis, then, I propose to rethink theconstitution of the libidinal economyon the basis of the drive for survival.Arguing against the notion of the death drive in Freud and Lacan, I seek to demonstrate that the drive[End Page 230] for survival allows for a better account of phenomena such as mourning, trauma, and repetition compulsion.Maintaining the conditions of possibility for life is a prerequisite to ongoing experiences with death Nidesh Lawtoo 5, Dept of Comparative Lit, U Washington, Bataille and the Suspension of Being, linguaromana.byu.edu/Lawtoo4.htmlBataille's notion of communication involves a dialectic with two positives (hence a non-dialectic) where two sovereigns confront death not in view of an end but as an end in itself: "confronting death," in fact, "puts the subjects at stake-"l'être en eux-mêmes [est] mis en jeu" (Sur Nietzsche 61). Further, Bataille affirmsthat "[p]ersonne n'est-un instant-souverain qui ne se perde" (OC VIII 429). It is the Nietzschean self-forgetfulness that is here evoked; a self-forgetfulnesswhich impliesa transgression of the limits ofbothcommunicating subjects. Again, for Bataille "[l]a 'communication' n'a lieu qu'entre deux êtres mis en jeu-déchirés, suspendus, l'un et l'autre penchés au-dessus de leur néant" (Sur Nietzsche 62).