narrow our strategic options … Investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could
threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups (US
Department of Defense 16 September 2009).
Gates’ geographical imagination of China in this speech is predicated on two inter-related assumptions
that exemplify a political realist “way
of seeing”. First,
China is not recognized as an “ally” of the US, although
it is clear that the US is the key driver of such politics of recognition in the
first place
. Furthermore,
it appears
that US military “protection” is a precondition to qualify as an “ally”,
a logic which automatically casts states without
such “protection” as suspect. Second,
China's
military-modernization process is ostensibly a “threat”
because
such
efforts could
,
in Gates’ terms, “
disrupt
” the “
strategic options
”
of the US in East Asia
, even when it is entirely plausible that
increased defense spending is to fulfil other valid purposes, such as replacing obsolete military equipment to address new threats by terrorists
and maritime pirates, and enhancing remuneration packages for soldiers. Third,
America wants to “project power” on its own
terms, which is why it becomes “
concerned
” when so-called non-allies
upgrade their defence
technologies
. This point is further reaffirmed in the Pentagon's 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review: “lack of transparency and the nature of
China's military development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and
beyond” (Pentagon 2010:60). However,
the extent to which the questions are “legitimate” is clearly a unilateral
legal-discursive construction of the US that reflects the
enduring effect of political realism
in US
security
thought
. These assumptions collectively constitute what Bialasiewicz et al (2007; see also Lott 2004) call
America's “performative”
security strategy
, through
which
perceived insecurities are constructed as ontological facts
so that
“
mitigation” measures could be justified
.
A critical assessment of the motivations behind China's military modernization policies is thus necessary before it can be ascertained whether a
“China threat” exists. First, while China is not recognized as a US “ally”,
it does not justify its defense modernization
programs through anti-US rhetoric. For Chinese policymakers, it does appear that the critical issue is
protection and consolidation of its existing territories
(more on this in the third section). According to Luo Yuan, a member
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, “China is the
only permanent member of the UN Security Council that has not achieved territorial integrity … We need to think more on how to preserve
national integrity. We have no intention of challenging the US” (China Daily 4 March 2010). In terms of defense budget, China's increased 2010
