Crimes where unsafe products are knowingly marketed to customerswhen

Crimes where unsafe products are knowingly marketed

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Crimes where unsafe products are knowingly marketed to customers/when manufacturers put products on the markets before their safety has been properly tested/verified - Fit the characteristics of WCC in that: 1) Manufacturer has legitimate access to customers 2) There is spatial separation between offenders and victims 3) The production of the flawed product occurs under the guise of legitimacy Role of ACCC ACCC powers contained in CCA 2010 (Cth) – Two Main Roles: - To preserve competitiveness of private enterprise ACCC competition regulator for the whole economy including financial services - To protect consumers from misleading and other inappropriate conduct ACCC has consumer protection jurisdiction with respect to the whole economy, other than financial services (ASIC is the consumer protection regulator in relation to financial services) Cartel Conduct - Giving effect to a contract, arrangement, understanding which contains a cartel provision Cartel Provision - Provisions designed to prevent certain forms of anti-competitive conduct - Provision in a CAU between two or more competitors with purpose of/has/is likely to have the effect of: 1) Price fixing 2) Allocating customers 3) Restricting outputs 4) Rigging bids Visy Cartel Conduct Case - Price-fixing arrangements involving Visy and competitor Amcor 2000-2004 - Conspired to raise prices of products while maintaining their respective market shares - Executives met regularly and secretly in public places and communicated using public phones and prepaid mobiles - ACCC became aware of scheme only when Amcor management reported the matter (Amcor granted immunity from prosecution) - Civil penalty proceedings concluded in federal court of Aus in respect of 37 contraventions of Trade Practices Act - Pecuniary penalty of $37m - Visy and Amcor paid $95m in damages to customers in relation to class action involving more than 4500 businesses - Visy triggered criminal actions for cartel conduct in which did not exist before International Air Cargo Cartel - Collusion of major airlines for setting of their fuel and security surcharges - Internationally, penalties exceeded $1.5b USD, several airlines faced class actions and had to compensate customers - ACCC pursued 15 local, European, Asian based airlines for price-fixing in Aus air cargo market - Federal court imposed $58m in penalties ($20m penalty against Qantas, $5m British Airways, $5.5m each against Japan and Korean Airlines) - Trigger companies – Air NZ and Garuda
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TNT Case - Allocation of customers and sharing the market by TNT, Ansett Industires and Mayne Nickless – largely controlled Aus freight industry - Agreement included not to poach each others customers - When customers moved from one provider to another, they balanced their accounts for customers lost and gained, and paid or received compensation - Burn switching customers by deliberately providing poor service to compel customers to return to previous supplier where they may have been dissatisfied - Pecuniary penalties $11m Criminal Penalties for Cartel Conduct -
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  • criminal law, WCC

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