policy under Ma, her administration will offer a cohesive, unified view of the requisite steps toward an “obstacle-free environment.” Taipei must necessarily maintain an ability to deter and deny Chinese access to the spaces surrounding Taiwanin addition to the island itself. Cross-Strait crisis stability depends uponreconstructing psychological considerations inBeijing and eliminating any perceived incentives for a preemptive strike. To be sure, some of Taiwan’s ability to strengthen and bolster credible deterrent capabilities also depends upon the support of the United States. Given the island’s location in the first island chain, the United States has a strong interest in a robust Taiwanese defense. Yet without priority given to building Taiwan’s indigenous defense capabilities, the island will lack a back-up plan should Washington’s commitment waver. Itis up to the new administration toensurepolicy, procurement, and planning reflect the demands of making Taiwan stronger and enhancing powers of both deterrence and denialwhile avoiding any moves that would threaten the political status quo.
Solvency---GuerrillaGuerrilla warfare with US support off of Taiwan’s east coast ensuresthe ROC will win the war of attrition. AND, it doesn’t escalate. Peter Enav 14, Peter Enav was head of The Associated Press bureau in Taiwan from April 2005 to April 2014., 6-3-2014, "Surviving China: A Game Plan for Taiwan’s Next Leader," Thinking Taiwan, No state is paying a heavier price for this phenomenon than Taiwan. As humiliating as the island’s diplomatic isolation ultimately is (only 22 remaining allies and counting down), it is really only a sideshow. Much more important for Taiwan’s future is the refusal of its once steadfast American partner to regard it with even a modicum of seriousness. Eighteen years ago Washington sent two carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan’s east coast in response to provocative Chinese missile launches close to the island’s territory. Can anyone imagine a similar response to a similar provocation today? The question answers itself. To get a sense of just how bad things really are one need only look at the Obama administration’s deliberate exclusion of Taiwan from its highly vaunted Pacific pivot (this despite its uber-strategic location at the geographical center of the first island chain), its studied refusal to provide the Taiwanese military with anything resembling a state of the art weapons system (lest the Chinese embark on another one of their carefully syncopated conniption fits), and its continuing opposition to Taiwan’s early inclusion in the potentially game-changing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade initiative. Taken together these and other slights suggest that Washington’s dream scenario for Taiwan is for the island to disappear seamlessly into the geopolitical ether so it can start getting on with the real business at hand: further developing its already