It is this paradigmatic conception of citizenship that has lost its power to convince today . But it always had a disturbing ambiguity that has now become apparent: are the uniform equal rights and respect owed to every citizen due to their individual status as legal persons or to their membership status as belonging to a particular political community? To put this differently, is the legal recognition of the rights-bearing individual presumptively granted to all human beings on this model or only to the citizens of a particular state ? Marshall's happy consciousness regarding citizenship as a principle of inclusion and equality and his assumption that the components of the citizenship principle come together in a frictionless way paper over this ambiguity. In fact, he never confronted it because he simply assumed, like so many others, that the identity component of the citizenship principle into which he hoped to integrate the working class through social rights was a given: the cultural identity of the demos construed as a nation. If we shift perspective away from the substantive rights of citizenship (Marshall's focus) to the formal dimension of membership things look rather different . The background presupposition of the modern paradigm of citizenship is that citizenship involves membership in a sovereign, territorial nation-state within a system of states. The nation-state is not only a territorial organization monopolizing legitimate rule within a bounded space, it is also, as Brubaker rightly argues, a membership organization (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship in such a state is an instrument of social closure. It always has an ascriptive dimension and it always establishes privilege insofar as it endows members with particular rights denied to non-members (today, primarily, the resident alien or foreigner) . Thus, in the modern system of states, the republican ideal of the self- determining demos merges with the sovereign state's interest in control over all those in the territory through the construction of national citizenship as a formal category of membership. Exclusion and inequality, not inclusion, thus attach to citizenship seen as a membership principle (Brubaker, 1992). To be sure, certain republican political theorists noted long ago the tendency of the nation-state to violate the egalitarian logic of constitutional democracy by fostering inequality and exclusion vis- a-vis national minorities and aliens . Hannah Arendt (1973) argued that this danger is intrinsic to the nation-state system . Because the nation-state equates the citizen with the member of the nation it collapses a political/legal category into a category of identity and perverts the egalitarian logic of the constitutional state by rendering those who are not members of the nation implicitly into second-class citizens . On the republican account, the problem lies in the reduction of the political principle of citizenship to a substantive exclusionary conception of collective identity: nationality. Accordingly Arendt argued for disaggregating citizenship from ascriptive criteria of
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