Now amount to unparliamentary speech and could only

now amount to unparliamentary speech, and could only be made upon the tabling of a
substantive motion but which, in many circumstances, could not feasibly be placed in
such a form. Furthermore, even if feasible, the requirement of such a motion being
tabled in itself would not only amount to a significant restriction on the freedom of
speech of Members of Parliament but, on occasion, would effectively be an absolute
one. In the present instance first respondent herself admits that first applicant could not
have moved a separate motion in a joint sitting of Parliament. The result is that he was

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precluded altogether from making the challenged remarks during the debate on the
President’s state of the nation address.
[60] Reverting to the test adopted in Lekota and making due allowance for the
deference which must be shown by the courts to the decisions of the Speaker in their
area of expertise and responsibility, I nonetheless consider that, in invoking the
provisions of the standing order, and in finding that first applicant’s statements were
unparliamentary, first respondent materially misconstrued the order’s reach. The
irrationality underlying the ruling lay principally in first respondent holding that first
applicant’s statement imputed improper motives to those Members of Parliament who
were members of Cabinet or reflected on their integrity by literally accusing them
personally of murder. The finding of irrationality is also informed by first respondent’s
partial reliance, at the time of making her ruling, on an invalid reason viz that first
applicant’s statement anticipated the findings of a judicial commission of inquiry. In the
light of the far-reaching implications of first respondent’s interpretation of the standing
order and its application to first applicant’s statement , I consider that the Court has no
alternative but to hold that first respondent’s initial ruling and those that followed
therefrom, were unlawful.
REMEDY
[61] Flowing from the above findings the Court must consider what remedy, if any,
must be afforded to the applicants. In doing so the Court is guided by the provisions of
sec 172(1) of the Constitution which provides that a court must ‘ declare that any law or
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid to the extent of its
inconsistency’ and may make ‘ any order that is just and equitable’ . Given the finding
that first respondent’s ruling s were unlawful, the primary relief sought by the applicants
must be granted, namely, that the various decisions made by first respondent on
19 June 2014 fall to be reviewed and set aside. As far as the further related relief

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sought by the applicants is concerned, viz that these rulings be declared unlawful and
invalid, the very rationale for setting such decisions aside is that they were unlawful and
I therefore regard such further declaratory relief as unnecessary.