35 for an analysis of these games in the arms control

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35 For an analysis of these games in the arms control context, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Trust but Verify:” The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements , 26 C ORN . I NT ' L L.J. 1 (1993). 36 See, e.g. , Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers , 14 Y ALE I NT L L.J. 335, 358 (1989).
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Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization 23 a. The Cybersecurity Public Good Game To a certain extent, the same characteristics that make some aspects of security against cyberterrorism a public good within a domestic society may also make it a “global public good.” That is, given the global nature of the internet, and the global dimension of the non-rival and non-excludible nature of security against cyberterrorism discussed above, there are certain aspects of global security against cyberterrorism that would seem to have the characteristics of a public good. Therefore, states may attempt to free-ride on security measures taken by other states, resulting in under-provision of this public good. Of course, to the extent that it is possible not to share new technologies that prevent cyberterrorism, these may be understood as club goods, rather than public goods. However, there will be strong incentives to share these technologies once they are produced, including marginal cost pricing and the network externalities that derive from cyberspace. The existence of a public good often gives rise to a collective action problem: while the aggregate benefits of cooperating to produce the public good exceed the costs, each state expects the others to contribute, and fails to contribute itself. Some collective action problems have payoff structures that make them prisoner’s dilemmas: coordination to contribute is the optimal collective strategy, but the individual dominant solution is to decline to contribute. States may choose to contribute to the production of the public good, or to attempt to “free ride.” Thus, the payoff structure might appear as follows. Table 1: A Prisoner’s Dilemma Game State B Contribute Free Ride Contribute 2,2 0,3 State A Free Ride 3,0 0,0 How can this problem of cooperation be resolved? As a matter of fact, in many circumstances, including some relating to the global environment, states are able to reach implicit (customary) or explicit (treaty) agreements to cooperate, and to enforce these agreements. 37 They are able to do so among relatively patient states, under circumstances 37 See, e.g., George Norman & Joel Trachtman, The Customary International Law Supergame: Order and Law (forthcoming) (custom); S COTT B ARRETT , E NVIRONMENT AND S TATECRAFT : S TRATEGIES OF E NVIRONMENTAL T REATY -M AKING (2003) (treaty).
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Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization 24 of frequently repeated, or linked, interaction, over a long duration, where information about the compliance or failure of compliance of others is readily available.
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  • Spring '12
  • Kushal Kanwar
  • global cyberterrorism

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