1 however this was a situation beyond ogundipes

1
However, this was a situation beyond Ogundipe’s military capabilities and he
could not assert his authority over the Northern troops. On Friday afternoon July 29
Ogundipe made a broadcast to the nation on Radio Nigeria. The message (which was
repeated from 2:30 p.m. onwards for the rest of the day) stated that:
As a result of some trouble by dissidents in the army, mainly in Ibadan, Abeo-
kuta and Ikeja, the National Military Government has declared a state of emer-
gency in the affected areas. Consequently, the following areas have been de-
clared military areas under the Suppression of Disorder Decree of 1966: Ibadan,
Ikeja and Abeokuta. Military tribunals have been considered and accordingly
set up. Curfew has been declared in the affected areas from 6:30 p.m. The Na-
1 Confidential report dated November 25, 1964.

Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture
118
tional Military Government wishes to state that the situation is under control
and hopes to restore peace and tranquility very soon. The government appeals
to the public for cooperation in its effort to restore law and order in the affected
areas.
However, the situation was anything but tranquil, and was deteriorating rap-
idly out of control. The Ikeja cantonment became the undeclared headquarters of the
mutineers, and the exasperated Ogundipe sent the Chief of Staff (Army), Lt-Colonel
Yakubu Gowon there to talk to them. When Gowon arrived, it appears that he was
not a free agent and was placed under guard. There he found that the leading figures
were Northern officers stationed in Lagos such as Lt-Colonel Murtala Muhammed,
Majors Martin Adamu, Shittu Alao and Musa Usman, and Captain Joe Garba.
Northern Secession: Araba
The military governor of the Eastern Region Lt-Colonel Ojukwu was not ini-
tially contacted but when he managed to reach Ogundipe by telephone, Ogundipe
informed him that Northern troops had given their conditions for a “ceasefire”: (i)
the repatriation of Northerners and southerners to their respective regions of origin,
and (ii) the secession of the Northern Region from Nigeria. Ojukwu replied: “If that
is what they want, I agree. Let them go!” and replaced the receiver.
1
At this stage
Ojukwu was willing to accept either the Northern Region’s secession or a continua-
tion of the federation, but the latter choice on the condition that political leadership
of Nigeria should follow army seniority.
The Northern soldiers were uninterested in a continuation of the status quo and
wanted the Northern Region to secede from Nigeria. To aid this objective they hi-
jacked a British VC10 plane which was supposed to fly to London. The plane’s cap -
tain, Alan Kerr, flew 96 of the mutineers’ family members and their property back
to Kano in the north. The mutineers also gave Northern civilians and civil servants
a forty hour deadline to evacuate Lagos,
2
after which they would destroy all sym-
bols of central authority in the south, and then pull northward leaving chaos and a
government vacuum in the south. Ilorin (a town in the Northern Region close to its
border with the Western Region) was put on alert to be ready to accommodate large
numbers of northward bound soldiers. Secessionist sentiment among the Northern
troops may have been strengthened by the fear that staying in Nigeria would give
Igbos an opportunity to gain revenge for the murder of Aguiyi-Ironsi and other Igbos,