6 maternalism as a theory rooted in practices of care

6. Maternalism
As a theory rooted in practices of care, care ethics emerged in large part from analyses of the
reasoning and activities associated with mothering. Although some critics caution against the
tendency to construe all care relations in terms of a mother-child dyad, Ruddick and Held use a
maternal perspective to expand care ethics as a moral and political theory. In particular, Ruddick
argues that “maternal practice” yields specific kinds of thinking and supports a principled
resistance to violence. Ruddick notes that while some mothers support violence and war, they
should not because of how it threatens the goals and substance of care. Defining a mother as “a
person who takes responsibility for children’s lives and for whom providing child care is a
significant part of his or her working life”, Ruddick stipulates that both men and women can be
mothers (40). She identifies the following metaphysical attitudes, cognitive capacities, and
virtues associated with mothering: preservative love (work of protection with cheerfulness and
humility), fostering growth (sponsoring or nurturing a child’s unfolding), and training for social
acceptability (a process of socialization that requires
conscience and a struggle for authenticity). Because children are subject to, but defy social
expectations, the powers of mothers are limited by the “gaze of the others”. Loving attention

helps mothers to perceive their children and themselves honestly so as to foster growth without
retreating to fantasy or incurring loss of the self.
Expanding on the significance of the bodily experience of pregnancy and birth, Ruddick reasons
that mothers should oppose a sharp division between masculinity and femininity as untrue to
children’s sexual identities. In so doing, mothers should challenge the rigid division of male and
female aspects characteristic of military ideology because it threatens the hope and promise of
birth. Ruddick creates a feminist account of maternal care ethics that is rooted in the
vulnerability, promise, and power of human bodies, and that by resisting cheery denial, can
transform the symbols of motherhood into political speech.
But however useful the paradigm for mothering has been to care ethics, many find it to be a
limited and problematic framework. Some critics reject Ruddick’s suggestion that mothering is
logically peaceful, noting that mothering may demand violent protectiveness and fierce response.
Although Ruddick acknowledges that many mothers support military endeavors and undermine
peace movements, some critics are unconvinced that warfare is always illogical and universally
contrary to maternal
practice. Despite Ruddick's recognition of violence in mothering, others object that a motherhood
paradigm offers a too narrowly dyadic and romantic paradigm, and that this approach mistakenly
implies that characteristics of a mother-child relationship are universal worldly qualities of
relationship. For these reasons, some care ethicists, even when in agreement over the