Nevertheless the us effort to make non prolif eration

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Nevertheless, the U.S. effort to make non-prolif eration a key policy goal was undermined —I call it supplanted. So we’re going to go through a few details about that, because everybody in this room, everybody watching this in one way or another, has paid a price as U.S. obligations under treaty and our own Arms Export Control Act have been systematically undermined for 50 years. And so, what we need to understand is that the root cause of this undermining leads directly to the Israel lobby . They want you to pay. They want you to continue paying. But they would prefer that you do not know what is going on, so it can continue indefinitely . I’m going to basically base a lot of the points I’m making on three concurrent lawsuits that are happening right now in DC District Court. One of them is about obtaining the entire black budget from U.S. foreign aid to Israel which is very large, but never disclosed. The other is to expose a new gag order that came out in 2012 which bans all U.S. federal workers and contractors from discussing the Israeli nuclear weapons program. Finally, a newly unearthed part of nuclear ambiguity policy , which are secret letters signed by presidents promising , in effect, to violate NPT and our arms export control regime . Professor Hixson already mentioned this this morning: This era in the 1960s, at the end of it, where the policy goals of the entire U.S. policymaking community for the Israeli nuclear weapons program were to compel Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to uphold U.S. obligations under that treaty, withhold the sale of nuclear delivery-capable Phantom jets from Israel that they wanted to buy, and compel the Israelis to dismantle their Dimona nuclear weapons facility. Their consensus, as stated in a memo compiled by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, was to avert a disaster in terms of the peace process. They felt that nuclear weapons would “ sharply reduce the chances for any peace settlement in the future”—and, boy, were they ever right. Israeli policy goals were to buy those nuclear-capable jet fighters, to maintain their Dimona facility, and to get the United States to enter into an Israeli-contrived policy of forever being ambiguous about whether they did or did not have a nuclear weapons program . And so, these two policy objectives were fundamentally opposed, and the United States decision factors really rotated around the Nixon assessment of the Israel lobby’s ability to mount pressure upon them. Henry Kissinger noted that if they made public the fact that they were going to base sales of these jets on the nuclear program, that an enormous pressure would be mounted on them by the lobby. Previous presidents, as Professor Hixson had alluded to, had already collapsed under this very same pressure, that they couldn’t pressure the Israelis without immediately having U.S.-based groups come to them and say, “you can’t do this.” So, there was another consideration within the policy compilation which they all considered.

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