intent behind both statutes as reflected in the legislative history but it also

Intent behind both statutes as reflected in the

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intent behind both statutes as reflected in the legislative history, but it also fails to respect our mandate to harmonize conflicting statutes “ ‘ “with reference to the whole system of law” ’ ” of which they are a part. (Michael G., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 296.) In 1941, the Legislature struck a balance as to the appropriate limitations period for prenatal injury claims, settling on the relatively long six-year limitations period for injured minors to assert their claims, but protecting defendants against the assertion of stale claims by expressly prohibiting tolling during the period of minority which could result in a limitations period in excess of 20 years. In 1954, the common law delayed discovery rule was held to apply to actions for prenatal injuries, ameliorating any harsh 9
effects of the prohibition on section 352 tolling. (Myers v. Stevenson(1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 399, 407; see also Young, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 892-893.) In 2004, the Legislature enacted section 340.8 on the heels of its enactment, a yearearlier, of a new two-year limitations period for general personal injury claims (§ 335.1). The Legislature plainly expressed that its purpose in enacting section 340.8 was to incorporate the two-year limitations period of section 335.1 for toxic exposure cases, to codify the delayed discovery rule for those cases, and to disapprove of the holding in McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that we should read subdivision (d) of section 340.8 to mean the opposite of what it says. Subdivision (d) of section 340.8 provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit, abrogate, or change the lawin effect on the effective date of this section with respect to actions not based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance.” Plaintiff argues the “clear import” of this language is that the Legislature intended to change the law in effect with respect toall claims based on exposure to toxic substances, including prenatal exposures. We read subdivision (d) to mean only that section 340.8 does not change any law except that it codifies the delayed discovery rule in personal injury cases based on toxic exposures that were previously governed by the two-year limitations period of section 335.1. Subdivision (d) states a limited purpose, not an expansive sweep. Nor do we find any merit in plaintiff's reliance on Young, supra, 41 Cal.3d 883, as support for the notion that subdivision (d) of section 340.8 expresses a legislative intent to cover all personal injury claims arising from toxic exposures, including prenatal exposures. In Young, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether section 340.4, or section 340.5 regarding medical negligence claims, governed an action alleging prenatal injuries arising from medical negligence. The court concluded that section 340.5specified the applicable limitations period, reasoning that “section 340.5 is a later-enactedstatute intended to cover all personal injury claims arising from medical malpractice.

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