respect to McKinney, the court found the record showed no evidence of any direct attorney-client relationship between
Shivvers and McKinney or that Shivvers benefited from, or relied upon, any advice from him. The court concluded Iowa
law only extended third-party recovery in legal malpractice cases to actions involving testamentary or donative
distributions. It did not consider Shivvers's claim that she was a third-party beneficiary of the sellers' contract with
McKinney. The court also found there was no support for Shivvers's claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
In granting Hertz' motion for summary judgment, the court found Hertz was the disclosed agent for the estate and
incurred no liability with respect to the sale of the property. It further found the auctioneer's limited role in serving as an
agent for the buyer did not give rise to a duty of care sufficient to support a claim of negligence.
Shivvers has appealed, claiming summary judgment should not have been granted on her claims of negligence,
professional negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. She has abandoned her contract claims.
II. Scope of Review.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there appears to be no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c)
. We examine the record before the district court to decide whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the district court correctly applied the law.
McLain v. State, 563 N.W.2d
600, 603 (Iowa 1997)
. We view the facts in *479 the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when the only conflict concerns the legal consequences flowing from
undisputed facts. Id.
Every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence should be afforded the party resisting a
summary judgment motion, and a fact question is generated if reasonable minds could differ on how the issue should be
resolved.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Iowa 1988)
.
III. Attorney McKinney.
[1]
Shivvers contends the district court erred in granting McKinney summary judgment on her claim of professional
negligence. She concedes she was not McKinney's client but argues that she was a third-party beneficiary of the services
McKinney contracted to provide for the Zenor interests.
[2]
[3]
Ordinarily, an attorney owes a duty of care only to his or her client.
Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518, 520
(Iowa 1998)
( Holsapple II ). “The limits of an attorney's duty of care have proceeded from a strict requirement of privity of
contract.” Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7.2, at 491 (4th ed.1996) [hereinafter Mallen &
Smith]. The privity requirement is derived from the following concerns:
First, absent a requirement of privity, parties to a contract for legal services could easily lose control over their agreement.
