Commander was more at fault for the outcome clinton

commander was more at fault for the outcome. Clinton, in his departing orders,
instructed Cornwallis that he could:
make such changes in the Position… as you may judge most conducive to
His Majesty’s Service for the defence of this important Post [Charleston], and its
dependencies. At the same time it is by no means my Intention to prevent your
acting offensively, in case an opportunity should offer consistent with the Security
of this place, which is always to be regarded as a primary object.
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To the naturally aggressive and bold Cornwallis, the orders gave him free rein to
pursue, engage and defeat rebel forces wherever he might find them. To the more
cautious Clinton, his intent implied the safety of Charleston and the posts above all. This
dichotomy of interpretation set in motion the basic tension between the two officers over
the campaign’s strategic direction. Clearly, from his correspondence and later defense of
his actions, Clinton intended that Cornwallis should make the defense of Charleston the
prime objective with any offensive operations in North Carolina to be conducted along
the Cape Fear River basin in cooperation with the Royal Navy. Such operations could be
supported by sea power operating out of the port of Wilmington, North Carolina.
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Clinton viewed the Middle Colonies and Chesapeake region as the decisive
theatre. If he could take Petersburg operating from a base in the Virginia Tidewater area,
the rebels would be forced to operate beyond the Blue Ridge Mountains, which in
essence denied reinforcement and support of all enemy forces operating in the Carolinas.
Additionally, Virginia operations would force Washington to respond in that region, thus
removing any substantial threat to Charleston and the South Carolina posts. A move
against Philadelphia might force General George Washington into a reaction that would
destroy the diminishing Continental Army prior to any significant French intervention.
The eventual detachment of the force under Major-General Alexander Leslie in October
to Portsmouth, Virginia supported that strategic concept. In theory, this plan seems like a
reasonable strategic approach. Herein lies the problem.
Cornwallis did not view the plan as did his superior. Clinton’s concept
encompassed more of a holding pattern that supported the Middle Colonies and Virginia
offensive, thus moving the Seat of War north. Ultimately, Clinton desired to mount a
campaign against Philadelphia (which he had been forced to evacuate in the spring of
1778) as supported by the establishment of a naval operating base in Chesapeake Bay,
most likely in the Tidewater/Hampton Roads area. Few notions could more roil the
aggressive Cornwallis than the thought of sitting in Charleston merely defending a city
and outlying posts. Thus, Clinton’s ambiguous orders and the carte-blanche to
Cornwallis to operate as he saw fit, created a cycle of command and control problems
from which no heroic effort on the part of British, Provincial or Loyalist soldiers could
overcome.