ports would complicate Beijing’s offensive plans to achieve command of the strait and blockade the nation’s ports. Together, 42 midget submarines, 1,200 ASCM and launchers, and a large inventory of mines would cost about US$1.5 billion, less than the planned eight diesel-electric subs, “while providing greater sea denial capability.” Rather than spending billions of US dollars to recapitalize its inventory of fighter aircraft, the nation should build a highly distributed and resilient networkof ground-based air defense systems. “The main objective behind Taiwan’s air defense effort should not be to destroy every intruding PLA aircraft, but rather to impose real and virtual attrition, while surviving to operate for as long as possible,” the report said. If China succeeded in establishing a beachhead, the Taiwanese army could “melt into the island’s urban and mountainous areas in order to wage a war of a thousand cuts against PLA occupation forces,” the report said.
AT: Deterrence FailsTheir “deterrence fails” cards describe current stupid deterrence where the costs of following-through on our threats dramatically outweigh Taiwan’s value to the US. This doesn’t apply for two reasons --- 1.Limited war--- even if less punishing--- is incredibly likely. China cares more about a costly conventional conflict than the distant prospect of nuclear war. That’s Nakazawa. It’s a different formof strategic ambiguityNoriya Nakazawa 15, Noriya Nakazawa is Lieutenant Commander of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)., 11-7-2015, "On Taiwan: An Option between Total War and Withdrawal for the U.S.," InPEC Magazine, Unclear US will to Defend Taiwan The US must have regarded Taiwan as a strategic importancein US security strategy. The US did not recognize the importance of Taiwan until the time when the Korean War broke out in 1950. Actually, the US did not include Taiwan in US defense area in the Far East until the occurrence of the Korean War. However, after Harry Truman’s “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea,” in which the president ordered the US Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan from China and toobserve Taiwan’s cease fire against China, the US has kept its strong tie with Taiwan. At this time, the US has practical relations with Taiwan based on the TRA. In spite of US-Taiwan historical relations, to my best knowledge, US official strategic documents do not have specific policy on Taiwan’s defense. For instance, the “US National Security Strategy in 2015” does not have concerns about Taiwan’s defense but ongoing issues in the South China Sea such as keeping the right of freedom of navigation. Additionally, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power,” by the US Navy, the Marine Corp and the Coast Guard, do not include anything about Taiwan. However, some researchers state that US strategy towards Taiwan’s defense is an indirect approach. Dean Chen, a lecturer at University of California, Santa Barbara, discusses that US policy. Chen explains that the US keeps provision of arms for Taiwan to promote its democracy and to maintain its status against China, and the US works on Taiwan not to provoke China, such as persuading Taiwan not to declare Taiwan’s independence of China. When