illogicality rule  Not a judge’s job to determine if a statute is logical 33

 But legal process might come back and say that the government is trying to make rational policies o Exceptions to plain meaning dissent discusses  None of these actually apply in this case, which is why court should have stuck to the plain meaning  Constitutional avoidance doctrine  Court may deviate if interpretation could render statute unconst.  Otherwise you would be invalidating an act of Congress by using the interpretation that renders law against the constitution o Then congress would not be able to change that, this ends the discussion between leg/judiciary  Scrievener’s error  They only correct clerical and typographical errors but this isn’t one  Absurdity doctrine  If plain meaning should not be used if result is absurd  But what is “absurd” is high contestable  Dissent rails against an “illogicality rule” o Statute being illogical isn’t enough to change it  The illogic here is really deep, so this exception may be in play more than dissent really gives credit to o Policy arguments  If legislative supremacy is the touchstone of the judiciary, this does not feel like respecting process  Majority would say that by rewriting the statute what they are trying to do is fulfill what congress really meant  Rewriting laws means citizens can’t trust the text of laws Dynamic Statutory Interpretation - Eskridge o Role of a judge is one of “ relational agen cy”  Influenced by legal process movement  Judge is doing work legislature asks of it  Should adapt the commands issued by the legislature over time  Fetch the Soup Meat example  Judges sometimes forego specific intent or plain meaning in favor of purposivist thinking o Meta-intent  Although legislature issues specific commands, they on some level expect the judiciary to adapt, be reasonable, and effectuate underlying purposes  We may feel better or worse about judges implementing a meta-intent depending on the level of expertise or if area of law - Favors the Weber decision 34

o Actually on Blackmun’s pragmatic reasoning  Blackmun is a good dynamic interpreter o Statutes evolve  The underlying purpose for the statue was no longer being effectuated  Brennan draws on purposivist sources but it’s a little misleading to call it a purposivist analysis o Holy Trinity Church  This isn’t really dynamic statutory interpretation traditionally  HTC interpreted the statute in the context of the time it was passed  Dynamic interpretation tends to believe statute evolves with society o This draws on very vague norms - In re matter of Jacob (NY CoA) o Policy rationale generally  Adoptions are good for children, statutes should be read in that light  Analysis should be driven by child’s best interest o NY legislature has changed who may adopt, meta-intent is to keep adapting statute o Constitutional avoidance problems  NY interprets statutes in the way that does not raise constitutional issues if two interpretations are possible 