and adequate remedy for the collection of said claim; (4) that the complaint upon which the order
appointing a receiver was issued does not show that the plaintiff therein had any interest in the property
to be placed under receivership.
Whether the appointment of the trial court for a receiver is warranted.
Authority, however, for the issuance of said order seems clear from the provisions of section 177 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to wit:
"If a receiver be appointed upon an ex parte application, the court,
before making the order, may require from the plaintiff or person filing the application for such
appointment, an obligation with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the court, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to the defendant in the application all
damages he may sustain by reason of the appointment of such receiver and the entry by him upon his
duties, in case the applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause; and the
court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional obligation as
further security fir such damages, if any, shall be ascertained by the court and, in its final judgment
in the action, shall be decreed against the plaintiff and the sureties on the obligation."
It is necessary
and legitimate inference from the opening statement of this section that an order of receivership may be
issued by the court ex parte upon proper showing in appropriate cases.
We agree with the suggestions of counsel for the petitioners that the appointment of a receiver, because
of its drastic nature and of its character as a special remedy under our Code of Civil Procedure, is a
power which should be exercised with great caution. But this does not argue against the existence of the
power of the court to appoint a receiver where the necessity therefor has arisen. In such a case, the
appointment of a receiver is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. Upon the other
hand, it is not disputed that after the appointment ex parte of the receiver in the present case arguments
both written and oral were presented and the defendants in civil case No. 51448 who are petitioners
herein made a credible effort to set aside the order issued by the trial court appointing a receiver. These
arguments appear to have been carefully weighed by the respondent judge who thereafter, in an order of
June 28, 1937, virtually reaffirmed his order of receivership. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or that the order of June 13, 1937 issued
by him is otherwise illegal for lack of notice to or hearing of the parties.
S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E