Interests on my belief 2 this sounds suspiciously

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Wrightsman's Psychology and the Legal System
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Chapter 14 / Exercise 1
Wrightsman's Psychology and the Legal System
Greene/Heilbrun
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interests on my belief. 2. This sounds suspiciously like “preponderance of the evidence” rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt” to me. However, it seems as though it may be in line with the court’s logic overall. If conviction cannot be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone unless there is no reasonable hypothesis of innocence, then if you show the only possible hypothesis is not reasonable, you can sustain a conviction. But I think there may be a subtle logical fallacy here: the rule doesn’t say that you must convict if there’s no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It only says that you must not sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence where there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The court could have still overturned this verdict on the grounds that the hypothesis consistent with guilt was not proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt . 3. Dressler covers the circumstances under which a judge may grant a motion for a directed verdict. This is how the trial judge makes sure the presumption of innocence is enforced. 4. If we assume that the trial court resolved the conflict between the two hypotheses in favor of the prosecution, it is actually easier to affirm the conviction, because we don’t need to say that the verdict was correct “beyond a reasonable doubt”, but only that “a rational trier of fact could reasonably have reached the result that it did”.
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Wrightsman's Psychology and the Legal System
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Chapter 14 / Exercise 1
Wrightsman's Psychology and the Legal System
Greene/Heilbrun
Expert Verified
(Pg . 19-28) E. Jury Nullification Introductory Comment J.D. sets up the question: should juries be able to nullify laws? Should they be told they can do so? Case: State v. Ragland State v. Ragland Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1986. 105 N.J. 189, 519 A.2d 1361. Facts: Ragland was convicted of several offenses. He appealed on the basis that the use of the phrase “must find him guilty” in the jury instructions inappropriately precluded the jury from its power of nullification, and that the jury’s power of nullification was an essential aspect of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Issue: Must a jury be informed of its nullification power in order for a verdict it returns to be valid? Rule: There is no rule, which is why the court must make its decision on the basis of policy. Analysis: The court makes clear its view that jury nullification is undesirable but unavoidable. It says that the jury should only be informed of its nullification power if such information would have a positive result in terms of policy. The court reasons that “advertising” jury nullification will result in confusion, arbitrariness, and a slippery slope of consequences involving the way attorneys and judges can and should address the jury at trial. Conclusion: Juries ought not to be advised of their nullification power. The verdict was reversed on other grounds and a new trial was ordered.

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