3 the views of the major negotiating partners in this

This preview shows page 20 - 22 out of 32 pages.

for the review of options to strengthen GEG (ENB 2001a: 4). 3 The views of the major negotiating partners in this working group crystallised soon. The US could not agree with the ideas of improving coherence and enhancing integration of governance institutions. It maintained that "the US does not believe that current IEG is incoherent" (ENB 2001e:5), suggested that alleged 'fragmentation' and competition in the system was better seen as 'healthy tension' (ENB 2001d: 2), and contested a strengthened mandate for the GMEF. 4 This obstructionism prompted an exasperated Swiss delegation to demand: "'Why are we here?" (ENB 2002: 5). The other major negotiating bloc (G77 & Ministerial Environmental Forum, could address issues in need of horizontal coordination and even instruct the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) (EU Speaking Points 2006b). 1 The Environment Council (2001) ventured even further by submitting that the gradual adaptation of UNEP "could ultimately lead to a World Environment Organisation, respecting existing headquarters". 2 The US was mildly in favour of this idea, for they counted on the GMEF to reign in the bureaucratic power of UNEP officials (Rosendal, this volume). 3 The group met six times in total and held its last meeting at the seventh Special Session of the GC in February 2002. The negotiations witnessed an eventual polarisation of positions, with the EU changing the focus of its reform proposals when it met an insurmountable impasse. 4 At the heart of US opposition was a straightforward rejection of greater codification and coherence which might eventually lead to regimes of monitoring and compliance or pose a threat to the WTO trading order by engaging in regulatory competition with it.
21 China) was only slightly more cooperative. 1 Lingering distrust of an environmental and potentially anti-development agenda played as much a role here as the fear of greater monitoring competencies which could highlight countries' lack of implementation and undermine their national sovereignty. The EU thus found itself confronted with truly formidable diplomatic opposition and gradually ceased talking about a WEO or UNEO. Turning towards a more incremental strategy, European negotiators concentrated on upgrading the status of the GMEF and called for universal membership of the GC which, they hoped, would ultimately lead to a natural demand for the GMEF's executive powers. G77 & China were not so easily distracted, however, with Nigeria challenging supporters of an upgraded GMEF "to come straight out and say that they want a new global environmental body" (ENB 2001e: 5). At the final meeting in February 2002, the EU, a handful of allies, and their plea for extensive reform including compliance monitoring, co-location of MEA secretariats and a stronger GMEF faced a US-G77 coalition which opposed language about UNEP's enhanced role, the idea of a UNEO, and kept referring the issue of better coordination back to the EMG (ENB 2002). Interestingly, the EU still left this session with mild satisfaction and an optimistic perspective for Johannesburg. This may have been the quiet contentment of a

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture