25 general george marshall also argued for a warning

25
General George Marshall also argued
for a warning demonstration of the bomb
in May of 1945, and after accepting the
decision not to do so, urged that atomic
bombs should be used only on strictly
military targets.
26
President Truman
appeared to agree with Marshall on
selecting military targets in both private
writings and public statements at this
time. He wrote in his diary on July 25 (during the Potsdam Confer-
ence) that “This weapon is to be used against Japan between now
and August 10. I have told the secretary of war, Mr. Stimson, to use
Admiral William Leahy,
the Chairman of the joint chiefs,
was particularly appalled
at the radiation effects
of atomic bombs and argued
that they were both
unnecessary and immoral and
would, like other weapons,
be used by future enemies in
a reciprocal way.
Admiral William Leahy.
Photo source: Truman Presidential Library.

23
ers continued to refuse to surrender unconditionally.
32
It does
not seem credible to assume that Truman, despite his public
and private pronouncements, was not aware of the true nature
and significance of the targets ultimately selected by his
authorized agents.
A third controversy involves the Soviet declaration of war
against Japan. Hasegawa argues that the shock of the Soviet attacks
on Japan were a greater influence on the Japanese Army leaders than
the atomic bombings in inducing them to accept an unconditional
surrender. He speculates that even without the atomic bombings, the
Soviet attacks, combined with continuing American naval blockades
and saturation bombings, would most likely have induced a surren-
der before the scheduled November American invasion of Kyushu.
33
If this is the case, Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been spared,
but the Soviets might also have claimed more territory in the Far
East and more scope in the occupation of postwar Japan, and many
more civilians would have died in further conventional bombings of
Japanese cities.
A fourth controversy surrounding the decision to use atomic
bombs against Japan stems from the argument that Japan’s leaders
might have been willing to surrender earlier (and without either an
invasion or an atomic bombing) if offered terms other than uncondi-
tional surrender. At least three of the president’s top advisors made
exactly this kind of case with Truman. Joseph Grew, who had served
as ambassador to Japan from 1931–1941 (and who was acting
Secretary of State in early 1945), approached Truman on May 28,
1945, with a proposal to modify the unconditional surrender terms
offered to Japan with a statement that offered explicit protection of
the Emperor’s status in postwar Japan. He argued that such a propos-
al might well sway the die-hard militarists in the Japanese Supreme
Council to accept defeat, and that it would be necessary to retain the
emperor in the postwar period anyway to preserve order.