Re-keying
– re-keying of expired keys
Key-establishment latency
– reducing the latency resulted
from communication and power consumption.
The core problem we realize in wireless sensor network
security is to initialize the secure communication between
sensor
nodes
by
setting
up
secret
keys
between
communicating
nodes.
In
general
we
call
this
key
establishment
.
There are three types of key establishment
techniques [5, 6]: trusted-server scheme, self enforcing
scheme, and key pre-distribution scheme.
The trusted server
scheme depends on a trusted server e.g., Kerberos [11].
Since there is no trusted infrastructure in sensor networks,
therefore trusted-server scheme is not suitable in this case.
The
self-enforcing
scheme
depends
on
asymmetric
cryptography
using
public
keys.
However,
limited
computation resources in sensor nodes make this scheme
less desirable. Public key algorithms such as Diffe-Hellman
[12] and RSA [13] as pointed out in [6, 7] require high
computations resources which tiny sensors does not provide.
The key pre-distribution scheme, where key information is
embedded in sensor nodes before the nodes are deployed is
more desirable solution for resource starved sensor nodes.
A
simple solution is to store a master secret key in all the
nodes and obtain a new pairwise key. In this case capture of
one node will compromise the whole network.
Storing the
master key in tamper resistant sensor nodes increases the
cost and energy consumption of sensors. Another key pre-
distribution scheme [5] is to let each sensor carry
N
– 1
secret pairwise keys, each of which is known only to this
sensor and one of the other
N
– 1 sensors (
N
is the total
number of sensors).
Extending the network makes this
technique impossible as existing nodes will not have the new
nodes keys.
In our security framework we introduce a secure
hierarchical key management scheme where we use three
keys: two pre-deployed keys in all nodes and one in network
generated cluster key for a cluster to address the hierarchical
nature of sensor network.
K
n
(network key) – Generated by the base station, pre-
deployed in each sensor node, and shared by the entire
sensor network. Nodes use this key to encrypt the data and
pass onto next hop.
K
s
(sensor key) – Generated by the base station, pre-
deployed in each sensor node, and shared by the entire
sensor network. Base station uses this key to decrypt and
process the data and cluster leader uses this key to decrypt
the data and send to base station.
K
c
(cluster key) – Generated by the cluster leader, and
shared by the nodes in that particular cluster. Nodes from a
cluster use this key to decrypt the data and forward to the
Cluster Leader.
By providing this key management scheme we make our
security framework resilient against possible attacks on the
sensor network.
In this key management scheme base station uses K
n
to
encrypt and broadcast data.
When a sensor node receives
the message, it decrypts it by using its K
s
.
In this key
calculation, base station uses K
n1..nn
to broadcast the
message.
This process follows as: Base station encrypts its
own ID, a current time stamp TS and its K
n
as a private key.


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- Fall '19
- Cryptography, Computer network, Public-key cryptography, Wireless sensor network, Distributed Sensor Networks