Rievman paper presented at a conference sponsored by

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Rievman, Paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Centre for International Legal Studies, February 2005; see also Baker, ‘At what price perfect justice?’, Presented as part of a coursebook for the 2009 Annual Meeting of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, New York, 15–16 January 2009. See, e.g., Redfern, ‘Stemming the tide of judicialisation in international arbitration’ (2008) 2 World Arb & Med Rev 21, at 24: ‘It would be comforting, at least for non US lawyers, if it could be 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120
From: Investment Claims (). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: Rumana Islam; date: 18 February 2017 assumed that the blight of increasing expense and delay in international arbitration is unique to the United States. It would be wrong, however, to make this assumption.’ The late René David, a distinguished French arbitrator and author, wrote that, historically: The arbitrator was chosen intuitu personae , because the parties trusted him or were prepared to submit to his authority; he was a squire, a relative, a mutual friend or a man of wisdom, of whom it was expected that he would be able to devise a satisfactory solution for a dispute. The Italian Code of Procedure of 1865 significantly treated arbitration in a preliminary chapter ‘On Conciliation and Arbitration’. See David, Arbitration in International Trade (Economica, 1985), p. 29. Under modern laws of arbitration and modern rules of arbitration, an arbitrator may decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties expressly authorise this: see paragraph 1.140. For instance, under New York Convention, Art. V, or Model Law, Art. 36. See, e.g., Rivkin, ‘Towards a new paradigm in international arbitration: The town elder model revisited’ (2008) 24 Arb Intl 3, at 378. See Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.192 ff . See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.211. There are many reasons for this, including (a) the huge sums of money that are often at stake, (b) the increasing professionalism of lawyers, accountants, and others engaged in the arbitral process, with a determination to leave no stone unturned (which can—and does—lead to excessively lengthy and repetitive submissions), and (c) the increasing ‘judicialisation’ of international arbitration, which has been discussed earlier. For a helpful discussion of how such legal fees and expenses may be allocated between the parties by arbitral tribunals, see Williams and Walton, ‘Seminar in print: Costs in international arbitration’ (2014) 80 Arbitration 432. One of the objectives of this volume is to show how this can be achieved by means of skilled and effective case management. For example, under the ICDR Rules, forty-five days may elapse after receipt of the notice of arbitration before the administrator is requested to appoint the arbitrator(s) and designate the presiding arbitrator, and this process may take further time, with the need to find suitable candidates who have no conflict of interest: see ICDR Rules, Art. 6(3).

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