are actually entitled to representation? Do the community's decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members? Such issues of representation are specifically political. Conceptually distinct from both economic and cultural questions, they cannot be reduced to the latter, although, as we shall see, they are inextricably interwoven with them. To say that the political is a conceptually distinct dimension of justice, not reducible to the economic or the cultural, is also to say that it can give rise to a conceptually distinct species of injustice. Given the view of justice as participatory parity, this means that there can be distinctively political obstacles to parity, not reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition , although
(again) interwoven with them. Such obstacles arise from the political constitution of society , as opposed to the class structure or status order. Grounded in a specifically political mode of social ordering, they can only be adequately grasped through a theory that conceptualizes representation, along with distribution and recognition, as one of three fundamental dimensions of justice. If representation is the defining issue of the political, then the characteristic political injustice is misrepresentation . Misrepresentation occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to wrongly deny some people the possibility o f participating on a par with others in social interaction— including, but not only, in political arenas. Far from being reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, misrepresentation can occur even in the absence o f the latter injustices, although it is usually intertwined with them. We can distinguish at least two different levels of misrepresentation. Insofar as political decision rules wrongly deny some o f the included the chance to participate fully, as peers, the injustice is what I call ordinary-political misrepresentation. Here, where the issue is intraframe representation, we enter the familiar terrain of political science debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral systems. Do single- member-district, winner-take-all, first-past-the-post systems unjusdy deny parity to numerical minorities? And if so, is proportional repre sentation or cumulative voting the appropriate remedy?" Likewise, do gender-blind rules, in conjunction with gender-based maldistribution and misrecognition, function to deny parity o f political participation to women? And if so, are gender quotas an appropriate remedy?12 Such questions belong to the sphere of ordinary-political justice, which has usually been played out within the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. Less obvious, perhaps, is a second level of misrepresentation , which concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political .