6 American Embassy Algiers to Secretary of State 31 January 1974 National

6 american embassy algiers to secretary of state 31

This preview shows page 2 - 4 out of 30 pages.

6 . American Embassy Algiers to Secretary of State, 31 January 1974 , National Security File (hereafter NSF), box 321 , Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California (hereafter RNPL). 7 . “Focus on Oil at the UN Special Session on Raw Materials,” Arab Oil & Gas (Beirut) III, no. 62 ( 1974 ): 5 - 6 . 8 . Airgram A- 4568 from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, 5 June 1974 , Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS ), 1969 - 1976 , vol. E- 14 , Part 1 , Documents on the United Nations, 1973 - 1976 , eds. William B. McAllister and Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2008 ), doc. 16 . Oil Power and Economic Theologies : 501 Downloaded from by Bora Laskin Law Library user on 06 September 2018
Image of page 2
that aimed “to correct the inequalities and redress the existing injustices” of the international economy, which the delegates qualified as “the remaining vestige of alien and colonial domination.” 9 Henry Kissinger, who had just assumed duties as U.S. Secretary of State, warned in the Sixth Special Session against the “temptation” for Third World nations “to think of cartels of raw material producers to negotiate for higher prices.” 10 His speech was an early moment in the history of a different understand- ing of oil power, a market-based vision that took hold of U.S. diplomacy towards the Third World. To play nationalist politics with the international economy, according to that vision, was irrational and dangerous. His delegation objected to the “heavily biased” NIEO, most strongly to the “heart” of the resolution: articles that allowed for nationalization, urged “just and equitable relationships” in international trade, and insisted upon the creation of more cartels. 11 This was just the beginning for Kissinger, who deprecated OPEC and the NIEO again and again in 1974 as irrational actors, using language that traded on the antagonism between politics and economics that resided within Samuelson’s universalist motif. High prices were “not the result of economic factors,” he said in one typical in- stance. Based on “a political decision” with no economic viability, they were quite simply “artificial.” 12 This article holds that Kissinger conducted a free market diplomacy in 1974 and after; that is, he demonized OPEC as an illiberal bogeyman and made the par- allel argument that the free market was the only rational system capable of meeting global economic challenges. To be sure, in Kissinger’s mind market diplomacy was an instrument with which to achieve a number of related diplomatic purposes, and he consciously shifted to a more conciliatory position in 1975 . That accommoda- tion, which downplayed the ideological division between the market and statist visions, was nonetheless designed to subvert the egalitarian and redistributionist arguments of the NIEO. The story is thus one of setting narrow policy parameters.
Image of page 3
Image of page 4

You've reached the end of your free preview.

Want to read all 30 pages?

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

Stuck? We have tutors online 24/7 who can help you get unstuck.
A+ icon
Ask Expert Tutors You can ask You can ask You can ask (will expire )
Answers in as fast as 15 minutes