1 that defendant herein was aware that john david

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(1) That Defendant herein was aware that John David Smith was ill during the period immediately preceding his death. It could be presented that the Defendant was ignorant in that he did not realize how sick the baby was. Defendant did not seek medical attention for the child at a state clinic as he did not want to accept what he regarded as charity. Weakened by malnutrition, the child died as a result of the illness. Defense can assert that he in fact loved the baby. However, they knew that medical help was available because of prior experiences before Defendant became unemployed and lost health benefits. They had no excuse that the law will recognize for not taking the baby to a doctor. (2) The defendant, Toby Smith, was negligent in not seeking medical attention for John David Smith. (3) That as a proximate result of this negligence, John David Smith died.
-5- From these and other findings, the court could conclude that the Defendant is guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter as charged. Prosecution takes no exception to findings but contends that the findings do not support the conclusions that the Defendant is guilty of murder in the first or second degree. Parental duty to provide medical care for a dependent minor child was recognized at common law and characterized as a natural duty. On the question of the quality or seriousness of breach of the duty, at common law, in the case of involuntary manslaughter, the breach had to amount to more than mere ordinary or simple negligence--gross negligence was essential. Under the statutes set out above, the crime is deemed committed even though the death of the victim is the proximate result of only simple or ordinary negligence. The information charging statutory manslaughter made no mention of and did not purport to restrict itself to the violation of the duty set forth in KRS 507.040. The information charged the violation of the legal duty of providing necessary medical attention to said minor child. This general language permits reliance upon the existence of the legal duty no matter from what source derived. We have already pointed out that such a parental duty is recognized in the decision set before this honorable court and has been characterized as a natural duty existing independently of statutes. We therefore hold that the violation of the parental duty to furnish medical care to the minor dependent child, the other elements of manslaughter being present, involuntary or not, is a sufficient basis on which to rest a conviction of the crime of manslaughter. The remaining issue of proximate cause requires consideration of the question of when the duty to furnish medical care should have become activated. Timeliness in the furnishing of medical care also must be considered in terms of ordinary caution. The law does not mandatorily require

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