strategically corrosive results, such as the present onslaught in Yemen . Even the most outspoken supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance will admit that U.S. guarantees have not restrained Tel Aviv from settlement expansion. As Asia becomes more competitive, a rearming Japan could also start to test alliance boundaries , either because of lost faith in American security guarantees or because it takes them for granted. In Eastern Europe, the cast-iron guarantee built into NATO could lead states to miscalculate and behave recklessly against Russian minorities in their own territory, quickly fomenting a cross-border crisis .
There is a difficult balancing act to be struck here, if the U nited S tates chooses to maintain allies to increase its material strength while containing those same allies . The threat of abandonment, or withdrawal of patronage, was once a greater part of U.S. diplomatic repertoire behind the scenes.34 The United States explicitly threatened West Germany, South Korea and Taiwan in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, for instance. It seems to have receded to an extent, after the Cold War, when the sense weakened of the need to keep allies in line coercively. Trump’s public humiliation of and threats to allies , usually followed swiftly by increased U.S. commitment, are probably too hollow and less effective in the long run than the quiet threats made by past administrations. Certainly, the U nited S tates has an interest in preventing allies being complacent about American guarantees, or worse, of the U nited S tates being so anxious about losing access and influence that it dare not exercise it. One of the superpower’s greatest advantages is its ability to leave. This is a possibility it should deftly exploit . Against traditional orthodoxies about “global leadership,” the overall U.S. position would benefit from the possibility that Washington might not have an ally’s “back” if it behaves recklessly against the superpower’s stated preferences, or if it hedges too much in favor of rivals. In other words, U.S. alliances are likely to serve U.S. interests better if it ceases fetishizing them.
nato good the other cards for this exist across all the neg files already
2nc – no fill in / eu fails NATO is key – the EU is unpopular and makes unified European defense impossible **this is also potentially a cp solvency advocate Stavridis, 18 - dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also an operating executive consultant at the Carlyle Group and chairs the board of counselors at McLarty Associates. (James, “The EU Is Looking Like Europe’s Next Failed Empire”, Bloomberg, )//rkp Walking the streets of Budapest along the banks of the Danube, one is constantly reminded of the glories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The grand buildings hearken back to an unwieldy political entity that eventually disintegrated in the aftermath of the First World War.
- Fall '19
- nathalie haurberg